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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes potential socio-cultural discord upon eventual Korean 
national reunification, owing to the predominance of the cultic state ideology of Juche in 
North Korea. Juche has become the fundamental framework of orientation for North 
Koreans. The hypothesis investigated is that, upon eventual Korean reunification, 
significant problems of national social cohesion, at least as serious as those faced by the 
reunified Germany since 1990, should be expected.  To this day — nearly two decades, 
and an estimated €1.5 trillion after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 — reunified 
Germany is recurrently affected by socio-cultural conflicts, based on ingrained values, 
past ideological conditioning, and resulting emotional ties and behavior patterns of the 
former East and West German societies.  Juche could foster similar or graver phenomena 
in a reunified Korean society, manifest in mutual and estranging grievances, ultimately 
impeding successful reunification. However, the Kim dynasty’s established virtuosity in 
adapting and developing Juche might in some circumstances combine with Juche 
elements of potential appeal to both Korean societies, such as national self-reliance.  
Instead of constituting an ideological barrier, Juche’s pan-Korean components might 
hypothetically be transformed into a common ground to alleviate societal conflict and 
eventually facilitate Korean national reunification. 
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I. JUCHE: A FUNDAMENTAL FRAMEWORK OF ORIENTATION 
THAT MAY AFFECT KOREAN NATIONAL RE-UNIFICATION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines Juche — the predominant North Korean state ideology. In 
particular, the thesis assesses whether and to what extent Juche offers a potential means to 
facilitate prospective Korean reunification. Conversely, to what extent might Juche constitute an 
ideological barrier to be overcome before effective re-unification of the divided Korean societies 
can succeed? 
The hypothesis investigated is that Juche has become a framework of orientation so 
fundamental to North Koreans that it is reasonable to expect that it could raise problems of 
national social cohesion after reunification, at least as serious as those faced by the unified 
Germany since the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), also known as East 
Germany, in 1990. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
1. The Wall Inside The Minds: The German Paradigm of National Unity 
The German re-unification experience suggests that ideological indoctrination, resulting 
values, and emotional ties can persist a long time, and may be displaced by democratic freedom, 
economic growth and the joys of consumerism only superficially. To this day, although the 
Berlin Wall came down in 1989, East and West Germans alike are recurrently affected by “The 
Wall Inside The Minds”1 — conflicts between individuals or groups of the former East and West 
German societies based on ingrained values, past ideological conditioning, and resulting 
emotional ties and behavior patterns. The German case suggests that the phenomenon of “The 
Wall Inside The Minds” might constitute a significant cause of individual and societal grievance. 
It might therefore hinder the reunification of Korean society. It is a factor beyond mere economic 
disparity that deserves attention. 
                                                 
1 The German phrase die Mauer in den Köpfen is translated here as The Wall Inside The Minds. The term 
reflects the substantial challenges and disparities in the unified Federal Republic of Germany between East and West 
Germans as a people, between their mindsets and characters, their historical narratives, and their goals and virtues in 




Indeed, Pyongyang’s Juche ideology could foster a similar phenomenon in Korean 
society. This in turn might subsequently cause different types of mutual and estranging 
grievances among and between North and South Koreans, leading to social antagonisms and 
ultimately impeding successful reunification. On the other hand, in some circumstances certain 
elements of the Juche idea (such as self-reliance and national unity) might appeal to a large 
number of people in both Korean societies. Some of its homogeneous cultural, ethical, ethnic, 
and religious elements could in fact present a common ground to alleviate societal conflict and 
eventually facilitate reunification. 
This thesis offers a contribution to the current Korean reunification debate. In particular it 
focuses on the political importance of mitigating potential societal grievances upon Korean 
reunification. 
2. Literature Review 
a. Juche: History, Theory, Practice, and Future 
The Juche idea was first advanced publicly by Kim Il-sung in 1955.2 In contrast 
to literature that classifies Juche merely as a North Korean version of Marxist Communism, 
Mitchell Lerner offers a more discriminating view. In his analysis, Kim Il-sung’s ideological 
break with Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology was established through: (1) rejecting the Leninist 
primacy of the vanguard party; and (2) discarding Marx’s focus on the working class as the 
driving forces of the revolution. Instead, Kim Il-sung established himself as the Suryong3 in a 
direct lineage from the ancient and mythical Koguryo4 dynasty to his own regime, while 
simultaneously modifying Marxism and Leninism according to his own practical needs. Hence, 
as the legitimate Suryong, and as the Great Leader of the revolution, Kim Il-sung would unite the 
                                                 
2 Kim Il-sung, On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work - 
Speech to Party Propaganda and Agitation Workers, December 28, 1955 (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1973).  
3 Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward. W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), 89. Per Lee, Suryong is the ancient Koguryo term for the king as being the maximum 
authority. For the Suryong’s role as the supreme leader and ultimate authority, see: Cumings, Korea's Place in the 
Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 30. 
4 Koguryo (also Goguryeo) was one of the ancient Three Kingdoms of Korea. Koryo (also Goryeo) is a 
shortened form thereof. The English name Korea derives from Koryo. 
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Korean proletarian and peasant masses and lead them in their development of collective 
revolutionary consciousness, and in their movement towards their socialist destiny.5 
Experts have described Juche as an “ideological construct” of self-reliance and 
national identity. Its concept of self-reliance calls for being individually and collectively free 
from external influences, pressures, and conventions of deference towards other nations.6 In 
addition, Bruce Cumings traces the term chuch’e back to ancient Korean history and makes a 
case for connecting the idea with Neo-Confucian virtues of loyalty, hierarchical order, and the 
power of the mind and heart.7 Selig S. Harrison holds that Juche has been developed from a mere 
idea of “nationalist ideology” into a “state of mind” and a “national religion.”8 At the same time, 
Han S. Park observes Juche’s strong nationalistic view of “the nation as an indivisible and 
deified sacred entity.”9 Cumings further connects chuch’e10 to the Chinese “late-nineteenth-
century self-strengthening movement” and to the Japanese Kokutai-rooted pre-World War II 
ultra-nationalism.11 Lerner maintains that Juche and its prescribed virtues have been developed 
as the lens through which North Koreans perceive life, society, and politics. “Thus the 
importance of Juche in North Korean society is difficult to overstate.”12 His evaluation is 
supported by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who explains (following Walker Percy) that 
cognizant perception is “an act of recognition, a pairing in which an object (or an event, an act, 
an emotion) is identified by placing it against the background of an appropriate symbol.”13 
                                                 
5 Mitchell Lerner, “A failure of perception: Lyndon Johnson, North Korean ideology, and the Pueblo incident,” 
Diplomatic History 25, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 655. For the supreme leader’s role to unite the proletarian and 
peasant masses, and lead them towards their revolutionary goal to construct a socialist state. See also: Dictionary of 
Philosophy (Pyongyang, Korea: Social Science Publishing House, 1985), 376. 
6 Lerner, “A failure of perception,” 647. 
7 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun. 
8 Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 15. 
9 Han S. Park, “The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology,” in North Korea Ideology, Politics, Economy, ed. 
Han S. Park (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 12. 
10 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 30. According Cumings, “Juche is the North Korean spelling of 
chuch’e.”  
11 Ibid., 413. 
12 Lerner, “A failure of perception,” 656. 
13 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 215. 
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Additional support comes from Ilpyong Kim, who asserts that Juche is North Korea’s “symbolic 
guide for every activity of revolution and construction.”14 
At the same time, Juche’s intense religious dimension is acknowledged by 
historian Tai Sung An, using the analogy of “the holy scripture.”15 This religious interpretation 
of Juche is further supported by Philo Kim, who reasons that “juche ideology can be called the 
‘religion of suryong’.” He concludes: “It is highly probable that the religious characteristics of 
Juche ideology in North Korea may bring about severe social conflict and psychological 
depression in the process of reunification.”16 
The 2006 International Religious Freedom Report substantiates the religious 
weight of Juche: “The cult of personality of Kim Jong Il and his father remained important 
ideological underpinnings of the regime, at times seeming to resemble tenets of a state 
religion.”17 Similarly, the 2005 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
report cites North Korean interviewees’ “astonishment that anyone in North Korea would 
practice a belief-system [that is, a belief system other than Juche] challenging the reigning cult of 
personality.”18 Finally, it seems remarkable that Adherents.com places Juche at number ten of 
the world religions, right behind Sikhism, but in front of Judaism in terms of numbers of 
adherents.19 
                                                 
14 Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea Praeger special studies in international politics and 
government) (New York: Praeger, 1975), 49. 
15 Tai Sung An, North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty (Contributions in Political Science) 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 24. 
16 Philo Kim, “An Analysis Of Religious Forms Of Juche Ideology In Comparison With Christianity,” 
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, no. 1 (2002). 
17 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “International Religious 
Freedom Report 2006,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71344.htm (accessed May 12, 2008). 
18 David Hawk, “Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(November 2005): iv-v, http://www.helpinghandskorea.org/publications/NKwitnesses_WGraphics.pdf (accessed 
May 12, 2008). 
19 Adherents.com, “Major Religions of the World. Ranked by Number of Adherents,” 
http://adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html (accessed May 11, 2008). Number of adherents: Sikhism – 23 
million, Juche – 19 million, Judaism – 14 million. Adherents.com describes itself as an Internet initiative, the second 
most frequently visited general religion site on the Internet, with an average of 13,500 unique visitors per day, not 
affiliated with any religious, political, or educational organization. 19 million adherents equals about 80 % of North 
Korea’s current population. Also: Kim, “An Analysis Of Religious Forms,” 140. The numbers from Adherents.com 
correlate roughly with Philo Kim’s 2002 estimates of 75% adherents (25% “fanatic”, 25% “who have both faith and 
doubt”, 25% “sham believers”).  
5 
 
Following Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the transition of power in North Korea 
amounted to “a bloodless coup.”20 Like his father, Kim Jong-il asserted that he would be the 
ultimate authority in articulating the state ideology. Selig Harrison refers to the Songun 
conception articulated by the “Dear Leader”21 as a “new constitutional structure in which the 
armed forces provide his personal power base and have replaced the Worker’s Party as the focus 
of political authority.”22 The smooth transfer of power in 1994 and Kim Jong-il’s subsequently 
unchallenged regime seem to confirm two important characteristics of Juche. First, Juche 
provides legitimacy to the Kim family’s dynastic succession, now and most probably in the 
future; Kim Jong-il has three sons, Kim Jong Nam (35), Kim Jong Jol (25), Kim Jong Un (22).23 
Second, Juche is adaptable and can be utilized to provide a legitimate ideological framework to 
meet present and future political challenges and needs. Accordingly, in 2003 Harrison observed 
that Kim Jong-il pursues a “reform of stealth.” Harrison predicted that “his [Kim Jong-il’s] 
measured reform process is likely to gain momentum during his tenure and set the stage for a 
more formal doctrinal shift to pragmatic economic policies either under his leadership or that of 
his successors.”24 
b. Juche: Ideological Barrier or Unifying Ideology – Implications for 
Eventual Korean Reunification 
In their 2001 study entitled “Psychosocial Aspects of Korean Reunification,” Do-
yeong Kim and Hye-jung Oh concluded that the “psychosocial unification” of North and South 
Koreans might be difficult to achieve, due to a “noticeable division in implicit attitudes” towards 
                                                 
20 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 53. 
21 North Korea officially refers to Kim Il-sung as the “Great Leader”. His son, Kim Jong-il, became a member 
of the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly in February 1982.  At this time Kim Jong-il grew to be North Korea’s 
heir apparent and assumed the title “Dear Leader”.  
22 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 53. 
23 Dirk Godder, “North Korea silent over Kim Jong Il successor,” India eNews, Seoul, South Korea, February 
14, 2007, http://www.indiaenews.com/asia/20070214/39480.htm (accessed May 12, 2008) “Experts suspect that 
Kim's oldest son, the 35-year-old Kim Jong Nam, might have fallen into disgrace with his father after he was 
arrested a few years ago in Japan on fake passport charges. The other two sons, Kim Jong Jol, 25, and Kim Jong Un, 
22, are from a different mother than Kim Jong Nam and are considered too young to be designated as Kim's 
successor.”  
24 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 53. 
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each other.25 Similarly, Gabriel Jonsson cites South Korean scholar Kang Suk Rhee,26 who holds 
that “North and South Korean leaders have by and large ignored the question of value integration 
at the expense of structural integration.”27 This view is supported by Roy R. Grinker, who 
advises South Koreans not to repeat the West German mistake prior to German reunification of 
“ignoring the extent to which half a century of division can produce significant social and 
cultural differences between the two sides of a nation.”28 
Referring to the work of Kook Sin Kim, who — in his study of the 1990 Yemeni 
reunification — advocated measures “to resolve the sense of heterogeneity among ordinary 
people,”29 Jonsson also acknowledges that “preparing for unification and encouraging human 
exchanges are indeed important tasks.”30 Additionally, the Finnish scholar of German 
reunification, Henri Vogt, also corroborates the importance of recognizing and addressing 
“significant social and cultural differences between the two sides of a nation.” 31 
                                                 
25 Do-Yeong Kim and Hye-Jung Oh, “Psychological Aspects of Korean Reunification: Explicit and Implicit 
National Attitudes and Identity of South Koreans and North Korean Defectors,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of 
Peace Psychology 7, no. 3 (2001): 284. 
26 Kang Suk Rhee, “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience,” Asian Survey 33, no. 4 
(1993): 365-66. 
27 Gabriel Jonsson, Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation (Hampshire, 
England: Ashgate, 2006), 3. According to Jonsson’s interpretation of Rhee (1993), “value integration…describes 
promotion of a feeling of a common race, language, culture, history and set of customs and traditions revolving 
around shared concepts of peace, freedom and prosperity.”  
28 Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures Unification and the Unfinished War (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998), xv. 
29 Jonsson, Towards Korean Reconciliation, 46, citing: Kook Sin Kim, “Yemen t’ongil pangsig-i hanbando 
t’ongir-e chunun sisajom,” [“Suggestions from the Yemeni Way of Unification to Korean Unification”] in Yemen 
t’ongir-ui munjejom [Problems of Yemen Unification.] (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yon’guwon, 1994). 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Henri Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment: A Narrative of the Political Transformation in Eastern 
Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 116. According to Vogt, “nostalgia for what had been before has no 
doubt existed in all post-communist countries, but in Eastern Germany this mood has been even more prevalent than 
elsewhere. This Ostalgie (Ost = east), as the word’s specific coinage implies, has been a very widely debated and 
analysed phenomenon in Germany and in the German media. Even language has been affected by this: a number of 
new terms and expressions, such as Vereinigungskrise or die Mauer in den Köpfen (unification crisis; the Wall in the 
heads), have entered the German vocabulary.” Vogt bases his observations on Derek Lewis, “The German 
Language: From Revolt to Division,” in The New Germany. Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of 
Unification, ed. Derek Lewis and John R. P. McKenzie (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995). 
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c. How Individuals Find Meaning — The Framework of People’s 
Orientation 
Viktor E. Frankl, in his work on logotherapy,32 examines how the individual’s 
ability and motivation to endure suffering depends on his inner strength and values. Frankl cites 
Nietzsche’s observation that “He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how.”33 
Frankl explores how an individual’s self-conception, inner motivation, and values influence his 
actions. He further holds that man’s mental health is based on the “tension” between his past 
accomplishments and the resulting expectations for future endeavors and achievements. 
According to Frankl, “man’s main concern is not to gain pleasure or to avoid pain 
but rather to see a meaning in his life.”34 Frankl highlights “the self-transcendence of human 
existence” and concludes that man can only achieve his aim of self-actualization as a by-product 
of self-transcendence by committing himself to “a cause to serve or another person to love.”35 
In the light of the previous discussion about the potentially significant social and 
cultural differences between the North and South Korean societies, the existing research on how 
an individual finds meaning holds essential implications for the issue of Korean national 
reunification. Frankl’s observation of “meta-clinical problems” seems to give weight to the 
religious dimension of Juche: “Some of the people who nowadays call on a psychiatrist would 
have seen a pastor, priest or rabbi in former days. Now they often refuse to be handed over to a 
clergyman and instead confront the doctor with questions such as, ‘What is the meaning of my 
life?’”36 At the same time, Frankl’s observation, informed by clinical experience, that “people 
                                                 
32 Viktor Emil Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy (Cutchogue, NY: Buccaneer 
Books, Inc., 1992), 108; (italics in the original). Frankl defines logotherapy as follows: “Logotherapy regards its 
assignment as that of assisting the patient to find meaning in his life. Inasmuch as logotherapy makes him aware of 
the hidden logos of his existence, it is an analytical process. To this extent, logotherapy resembles psychoanalysis. 
However, in logotherapy’s attempt to make something conscious again it does not restrict its activity to instinctual 
facts within the individual’s unconscious but also cares for existential realities, such as the potential meaning of his 
existence to be fulfilled as well as his will to meaning. … Logotherapy deviates from psychoanalysis insofar as it 
considers man a being whose main concern consists in fulfilling a meaning, rather than in the mere gratification and 
satisfaction of drives and instincts, or in merely reconciling the conflicting claims of id, ego and superego, or in the 
mere adaptation and adjustment to society and environment.”  
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, as quoted in Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, 84, (italics in the original). 
34 Ibid., 117. 
35 Ibid., 115. 
36 Ibid., 120. 
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have enough to live by but nothing to live for; they have the means but no meaning”37 seems to 
underline the importance of value integration upon Korean amalgamation. 
Juche in itself, economic and other structural factors, and socio-cultural aspects of 
eventual Korean national reunification have received ample scholarly attention. There are few 
works, however, that acknowledge the significance of Juche for a successful Korean merger, let 
alone examine the importance of Juche as a potential source of ideas for Korean society as a 
whole upon reunification. This thesis aims to fill this gap, and hopes to trigger further scholarly 
interest and appreciation for the frequently ignored but nonetheless most important issue of 
social unity upon eventual Korean national reunification. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
a. A Qualitative Analysis of Socio-Cultural Differences as Independent 
Variables for Successful Korean National Re-unification 
In order to establish a solid basis for discussion and to be able to subsequently 
draw valid conclusions, Chapter II analyzes the conceptual framework of North Korea’s Juche 
ideology and considers whether it is a utopian revolutionary idea, a socialist state ideology, or a 
comprehensive state religion. Juche’s apparently holistic power, authority, and penetration of 
North Korean individual and societal life deserve investigation. Chapter III reviews the German 
national reunification process since 1990 and assesses how and to what extent socio-cultural 
reunification has been achieved in the German case. It is relevant for the purpose at hand to 
investigate the roots and effects of the German issues known as the “Unification Crisis” or “The 
Wall Inside The Minds.” The findings of this retrospective analysis provide the analytical basis 
for the subsequent investigation of the prospective socio-cultural issues in the Korean 
reunification case.  In Chapter IV judgments are offered as to what extent factors influential in 
the German experience of social reunification are present and applicable to today’s Korean 
societies. This includes considering the common conjecture that the North Korean “Wall Inside 
The Minds” might be significantly taller and thicker than the German one. Finally, Chapter V  
 
                                                 
37 Friedrich Nietzsche, as quoted in Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, 84, (italics in the original), 142. 
9 
 
examines whether Juche could offer a common ground for North and South Koreans and help 
facilitate prospective national reunification, rather than constituting an ideological barrier 
between the societies on both sides of the 38th parallel. 
Based on the experience of the German national reunification since 1990, 
including its effects on societal unity and national cohesion, a comparison with the Korean case 
may reveal to what degree similar effects should be expected upon Korean national reunification. 
Consequently, the dependent variables to be observed in the wake of Germany’s reunification are 
national cohesion and socio-cultural integration. Prosperity, economic growth and political 
freedom are well quantifiable and generally uncontested independent variables, describing vital 
cornerstones to ultimately mold a unified society. Especially in light of Frankl’s work, however, 
it is clear that materialistic and constitutional arrangements alone will not suffice. Shared values 
and convictions, common purposes, and an agreed national narrative are probably of greater 
importance. This study focuses on the less objective, harder to quantify, and easily disputable 
independent variables in the realm of national homogeneity and cohesion: above all, the 
magnitude of socio-cultural assimilation and social unity currently present in the Korean 
societies on both sides of the 38th parallel. The resulting findings are then utilized to assess 
whether elements of the Juche ideology might in some circumstances serve as a means to level 
existing differences in order to surmount ideological barriers that might be causes of conflict 
upon Korean national reunification. 
2. Sources 
a. The Dilemma of Researching on the Hermit Kingdom 
For Juche’s history and theory, primary and secondary sources are abundant. 
Moreover, more than one and a half decades after German national reunification, socio-cultural 
differences and conflicts in the German case have been well accounted for in literature. The same 
is true of sources concerning the quasi-religious facets of Juche and the psychological aspects of 
belief systems and ideologies. Due to the reclusive nature of the North Korean regime, however, 
Juche’s current practice has to be deduced from secondary and tertiary sources. As with many 
studies on North Korea, accounts from defectors, as well as official North and South Korean 
sources, in conjunction with media sources, are utilized to construct an understanding of Juche’s 
impact on and penetration of North Korean society and daily life. The nature of these sources 
10 
 
suggests an inherent bias towards the respective North or South Korean perspective. However, 
due to the relevance and the comprehensive historical validation of the German case, a 
comparative and qualitative analysis of potential societal discord and conflict upon eventual 
Korean reunification seems warranted. The aspiration of this study is not to quantify the 
expected cultural differences, but to analyze their prospects and to initiate a broad discussion 
about how to confront North Korean Juche to overcome socio-cultural differences between the 



















II. JUCHE: UTOPIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, SOCIALIST STATE 
IDEOLOGY, OR STATE RELIGION? 
The swift breakdown and peaceful dissolution of the German Democratic Republic (the 
GDR, also known as East Germany) — eventually effected by the people in the streets — seemed to 
communicate a clear message to the world. The Communist experiment had failed; Realexistierender 
Sozialismus (real existing Socialism) had finally laid down its arms and surrendered to western 
liberalism and capitalism.38 Eric Cornell, the former Swedish chargé d’affaires in Pyongyang, 
labeled his own answer as to why the state socialist economies collapsed a “platitude:” “their system, 
based on Marxist ideology, lost the contest against the market economy.”39 A wave of transition, 
coursing through Eastern Europe, swept over even the most loyal Soviet allies and Soviet republics. 
To the world’s amazement, within months of the Berlin Wall coming down, young emerging 
democracies throughout the former Warsaw Pact region were rapidly severing their Soviet-era 
Communist umbilical cords. The rapidity and enthusiasm with which the vast majorities of the 
populations were eager to jettison their ideological ballast seemed to convey the weak and superficial 
hold of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The prospects of a liberal democratic society, economic growth, 
and consumerism appeared to collapse the Communist regimes and their ideologies like a house of 
cards. 
                                                 
38 The term Realexistierender Sozialismus (real existing Socialism) was introduced by Soviet propaganda in the 
1970s to designate the more open forms of government that had evolved in several Communist countries. The term 
was often used in order to differentiate traditional, conventional (or ideal) Socialism from the de facto Socialism 
existing in the Eastern bloc countries. Real referred to the fact that in reality, not all the utopian principles of 
Socialism and Communism could be implemented immediately. Accordingly, in the real world, the real existing 
Socialism would only be an interim arrangement before establishing the ideal Socialist society. The anti-Communist 
opposition used the term in a sense of ironic criticism. Other Communist regimes charged that such a watered down 
version of socialism compromised and betrayed Communism, and consequently chose to relax their alignment with 
the Soviet Union (e.g., the Democratic Republic of North Korea, the D.P.R.K.). 




Accordingly, since the early 1990s, North Korea’s implosion has been predicted routinely by 
political analysts and scholars alike.40 After all, it could be expected that North Korea’s similarly 
utopian and terminally ill Marxist-Leninist ideology, due to a failing economy and widespread 
famine, would prove to be equally incapable of fending off liberalization and democratization. 
However, against all odds and prophesies, North Korea’s regime and its society have survived more 
than one and a half decades of economic isolation and struggle, agricultural and industrial decline, 
privation, and famine as “the world’s last Stalinist regime.”41 
In a 2004 analysis, economist Nicholas Eberstadt explained that the “Economic Collapse”42 








                                                 
40 Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” Policy Review, no. 127 (October 1, 2004): 23-24,  
Renowned political economist and North Korea expert Nicholas Eberstadt has frequently predicted North Korea’s 
collapse since 1990. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=731115631&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=
PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1203705310&clientId=11969, also: 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3436436.html (accessed May 11, 2008). Also, Reuben F. Johnson, 
“Clock ticking for Kim's Korea,” Janes’s Information Group, January 24, 2008, 
http://www.janes.com/news/security/countryrisk/jdw/jdw080124_1_n.shtml (accessed May 11, 2008). Further, this 
recent Jane’s publication cites a joint report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the US Institute 
for Peace, revealing that “China has ‘contingency plans’ in the event of North Korea's implosion.” At the same time, 
“recent actions of Kim Jong-Il and other North Korean officials are being interpreted as signs that the regime is 
nearing its end,” while “the 'Dear Leader' [Kim Jong-il] is in the process of moving financial resources to ensure that 
his assets are portable should he have to go into exile, according to some sources.”  
41 Chol-hwan Kang and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag 
(New York: Basic Books, 2005), xv. North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov maintains that “Applying the word 
‘Stalinism’ to North Korea nowadays, however, is misleading. Though still a brutal tyranny engaged in nuclear 
brinkmanship, North Korea is no longer a Stalinist state. The system of omnipresent government control began to 
fall apart before Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, and the devastating famine of 1996 – 99 dealt the final blow to North 
Korean Stalinism. Unlike the USSR and China, where the Stalinist systems were dismantled through reforms from 
above, North Korean Stalinism has actually crumbled under the weight of its own economic inefficiency.” Andrei 
Lankov, “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism,” Asia Policy, no. 1 (January 2006): 97, 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/pdf/ap1-lankov.pdf (accessed April 20, 2008). 
42 Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” 29. “‘Economic Collapse’… as a term to describe the 
breakdown of the division of labor in the national economy – the process through which ordinary people in complex 
productive societies trade their labor for food.” 
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generation through illicit activities, and millions of dollars worth of illegally transferred financial aid 
from South Korea.43 In addition, he held the U.S. “foreign aid lifeline to the DPRK” responsible for 
the regime’s continued survival.”44 
Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig explained the authoritarian regime’s survival through 
effective coercion and control of the population and the elites through its security organizations. 
According to their assessment, “People are monitored by overlapping military and quasi-military 
security organizations. … The two principal domestic intelligence organizations are the Ministry 
of People’s Security (MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD).”45 The central objective of 
the MPS and the SSD is to “permeate every sector of society and to monitor the private and 
public life of North Korean citizens and foreign visitors.”46 According to Kong Dan Oh and 
Ralph C. Hassig, “The greatest threat to the security of the Kim regime would come from a 
palace coup by top cadres or by the security people… To forestall such a coup in North Korea, 
Kim Jong Il puts his top people under multiple sources of surveillance.”47 Ultimately,  
Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig concluded: 
North Koreans are expected to inform on one another, even children on their 
parents, because if they do not report a crime and it is discovered, they are 
implicated. A basic principle in North Korea is that two people who trust each 
other may discuss sensitive issues, but when a third joins them, nothing can be 
said. Between two people, if one accuses the other of disloyalty, it is one person’s 
word against the other. With three people, each must fear that the other two may  
 
                                                 
43 Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,” 32-33. “Unfortunately, we cannot be precise about this, since 
many of the sources of funds involve illicit transactions. North Korea’s international counterfeiting, drug trafficking, 
weapons, and weapon technology sales all figure here, although the sums raised from those activities are a matter of 
some dispute. Nor do we yet know exactly how much of the South Korean taxpayers’ money was furtively 
channeled from Seoul to Pyongyang during this period. One set of prosecutorial investigations has convicted former 
President Kim Dae Jung’s national security adviser and several other aides of illegally transferring up to $500 
million to Kim Jong Il’s ‘Bureau 39’ (a unit of the ruling party specially charged with funding Kim’s royal court) on 
the eve of the historic June 2000 Pyongyang summit. The possibility of other unreported official Seoul-to-
Pyongyang payoffs during the 1998 – 2003 period cannot be ruled out — nor, of course, can the potential volume of 
any such attendant funds be determined.”  
44 Ibid., 35, and Table 2. “Ironic though it may seem… Washington’s foreign aid lifeline to the DPRK in recent 
years looks more significant than any Washington has arranged in recent years for allies or friends.”  
45 Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000), 135. 
46 Ibid., 137. 
47 Ibid., 138. 
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report the incident and thus each is motivated to report on his own behalf – an 
example of the prisoner’s dilemma. Hence the near impossibility of organizing 
any kind of resistance movement against the Kim regime.48 
Bruce Cumings complemented their assessment by observing that: 
Kim Jong Il, like his father, truly trusts only his relatives when it comes to the top 
security organs. Several top commands responsible for the security of the capital 
are in the hands of a group of four brothers who are in–laws to Jong Il’s sister, 
with the eldest brother responsible for the army corps that defends Pyongyang.49 
Accordingly, it can be ascertained that brinkmanship, state involvement in illicit activities, and 
the regime’s authoritarian tools undoubtedly share responsibility for the Kim dynasty’s 
endurance so far. 
Subsequently, however, the focus in this analysis is on North Korea’s Juche idea as a 
major factor in the regime’s survival. The thesis considers how the Pyongyang regime has 
managed to utilize Juche for its own retention of power. This chapter aims to clarify how Juche 
— contrary to superficially adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology in Eastern Europe — exercises an 
apparently holistic power, authority, and penetration of North Korean individual and societal life 
that is far beyond any experience in the European cases. Consequently, in contrast to the card-
house-like collapse of GDR ideology, the argument is that Juche’s structural and emotional 
effects on the North Korean masses and elites constitute a significant element in the regime’s 
future survival and will be a major factor upon eventual Korean reunification. 
Juche’s mélange of Confucian-inspired vision and utopian ideas, pseudo-scientific 
ideological ingredients derived from Marxism-Leninism, and religious and cultic elements are 
examined below.50 The initial section approaches the concept of Juche through the lens of a 
utopian idea. The concept of utopia, in the sense of a radicalization of dreams and hopes, 
                                                 
48 Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, 139-140. 
49 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2004), 169. 
50 It can be viably argued that North Korea’s political reality is far from Communism / Socialism. Instead, 
Korea scholars and experts describe Juche as an evolution of Socialist ideology, creating the basis for North Korea’s 
nationalist ideology (some say national religion) of Kimilsungism. Kimilsungism is the North Korean term for Kim 
Il-sung’s family regime. This term subtly emphasizes its independence and autonomy from Marxism, Leninism, 
Stalinism, etc. The Juche Idea, as the official state ideology of North Korea, and the political system based on it 
form a doctrinal component of Kimilsungism. Apart from Juche’s ideological drift and differences from 
Communism / Socialism, however, North Korea’s political system features all aspects of Stalinist paternalism and 
suppression to a distinctive extent. For further reference see: Dongsung Kong, “North Korea,” in The Political Role 
of the Military: An International Handbook, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Ann Watson (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 328; Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 414; and Harrison, Korean Endgame, 15. 
15 
 
supports the notion of Juche as an emotionally bonding framework for an individual and 
collective experience of confidence, faith, and hope. The subsequent section examines Juche’s 
ideological aspirations as an evolution of Marxist-Leninist theory and its resultant scientific 
claim. A third part explores Juche’s religious texture and cultic consecration. The concluding 
assessment in the final section of this chapter considers whether Juche is a utopian revolutionary 
idea, a Korea-specific ideological adaptation of socialist theory, or a comprehensively devout 
state religion of a dynastic cult.  
A. JUCHE — A UTOPIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 
In the early sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More first wrote about Utopia as an imaginary 
country of ideal perfection in laws, government, and social conditions.51 Merriam Webster’s 
Dictionary explains that the word Utopia derives from the “Greek ou not, no + topos place,” 
literally meaning no place or nowhere.52 In contrast, the British Library maintains that “the 
almost identical Greek word eu-topos means a good place,” a witticism on Utopia’s “vital 
question: can a perfect world ever be realised?”53 
Henri Vogt, in his “Narrative of the Political Transformation in Eastern Europe” presents 
a complex discussion on Utopian philosophy.54 His analysis is based on the German philosopher 
Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) and his main work Das Prinzip Hoffnung (1959).55 In Vogt’s 
evaluation of the “transformative capacity” of utopias, he utilizes Bloch’s essential 
                                                 
51 Sir Thomas More (1478 – 1535), canonized in 1935 for his martyrdom. In 2000, Pope John Paul II named St. 
Thomas More patron of politicians and the governing. As Lord Chancellor to Henry VIII he refused to sanction 
Henry's divorce of Queen Catherine, his ensuing marriage to Anne Boleyn, and the following secession from the 
Roman Catholic Church. More was imprisoned, tried and convicted for treason, and eventually decapitated in 1535. 
His main literary work, “De optimo rei publicae statu deque nova insula Utopia“ (Utopia, 1516), outlines an ideal 
human society and constitutes utopia as an independent literary and philosophical category.“Plato's Republic and the 
Laws provide models for More's reflections on the good citizen and the good state, but More's Utopia is significantly 
different from these models and blends a variety of philosophical influences. In contrast to the Platonic Republic, 
More's society is a communistic democracy and not an aristocracy with communism confined to the ruling elite.” 
See: Oregon State University, “Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),” 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/philosophers/more.html (accessed May 11, 2008); also: Thomas More, The 
Complete Works of St. Thomas More (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). 
52 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., s.v. “Utopia,” 1379. 
53 The British Library Board, s.v. “Utopia,” http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/21cc/utopia/utopia.html 
(accessed May 11, 2008). 
54 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 76 ff. 
55 For the original version see: Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung ([Frankfurt am Main]: Suhrkamp, 1959). For 
the first American edition see: Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope (Studies in Contemporary German Social 
Thought) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
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differentiation between “abstract utopia” and “concrete utopia.”56 With reference to Ruth 
Levitas’s 1997 work on “Educated Hope,” Vogt points out that concrete utopia is “not merely 
wishful but willful thinking.”57 Consequently, he infers that “concrete utopia easily assumes a 
political role whereas an abstract utopia does not.”58 In conclusion, Vogt offers three key 
observations on Utopia: 
1. Utopia is a real and actual element of any human life. 
2. Utopia is transformative – it has the capacity to transform the present with the 
premises of the future. 
3. Many different types, scales and functions of utopias can, and often do, co-exist.59 
North Korea’s “philosophical mixture of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Confucianism and 
traditional Korean heritage that is Juche,” comprises a similarly concrete utopian vision.60 
According to Paul French, “Juche is seen as the way the nation will move to chaju 
(independence) in a process that is equatable with the Marxist-Leninist notion of socialism as a 
transitional stage to communism.”61 Complementary to Maoism and Marxism-Leninism, Juche 
is advertised as the North Korean variant — the third way. Although exclusively Korean, Juche 
claims to be a universally adaptable vision for all developing countries on the road to 
emancipation from imperialism and towards national identity and cohesion. In Kim Jong-il’s 
view: 
The struggle to preserve the Juche character and national character is the struggle 
against imperialism and dominationism… The imperialist ‘aid’ is a noose of 
plunder and subjugation aimed at robbing ten and even a hundred things for one 
thing that is given. The revolutionary parties and peoples must see clearly the 




                                                 
56 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 81-82. “The abstract utopia has not really become a reality yet: it 
is a mere dream; it is not – (yet –) conscious. The concrete utopia, instead, exists in [sic] the horizon of reality: it is a 
daydream: ‘Konkrete Utopie steht am Horizont jeder Realität’ (Bloch 1959: 258).”  
57 Ruth Levitas, “Educated Hope: Ernst Bloch on Abstract and Concrete Utopia,” in Not Yet: Reconsidering 
Ernst Bloch, ed. Jamie Owen Daniel and Tom Moylan (London and New York: Verso, 1997), 67. 
58 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 82. 
59 Ibid., 83. 
60 Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula--a Modern History (London: Zed Books, 2007), 5. 
61 Ibid., 30. 
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imperialism, must always keep to the anti-imperialist, independent stand 
determinedly and wipe out even the slightest element of illusions about the 
imperialists.62 
Accordingly, Juche has become a fundamental aspect of North Korean identity and self-
perception towards an alternative model of socialist development — particularly suitable for 
third world and other non-aligned states. Juche’s embracing of optimism and its collective sense 
of mission towards a paradisian future are both naively utopian and highly messianic. According 
to Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, Juche is the “guiding principle” towards the North Korean 
paradise: 
Here is the North Korean socialist dream: a communal society, blessed with an 
abundance of goods produced and exchanged without the need for money. These 
happy people are bound together like a great national tribe, insulated from the 
economic and political strife of the international community by the fact that the 
nation is economically self-sufficient. Being productive and self-sufficient, the 
people are the equal of any nation on the globe, large or small. 
They envy no one, for they live in an earthly paradise.63 
In this context, North Korea’s real situation of paucity and famine, international isolation, 
and dependency on foreign aid — from a Juche disciple’s view — seems entirely irrelevant. 
After all, North Korea, guided by Juche, was ultimately the “economically and morally superior 
system that had the future before it, and they [the North Koreans] saw proof of it every day in the 
modern society that had taken shape round about them during the last few decades.”64 
                                                 
62 Kim Johg-il, “On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of the Revolution and 
Construction,” (June 19, 1997), 15, http://www.korea-dpr.com/library/111.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008). 
63 Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, 15. 
64 Cornell, North Korea Under Communism, 105. “Furthermore, their [North Korean] upbringing included a 
malicious portrait of other social forms, the accuracy of which they had never questioned.” 
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Analogous to other utopian endeavors, Juche comprises the core utopian concept of a 
paradise on earth that seems essentially appealing and dear to human beings.65 Elements of the 
utopian conception are continuously propagated by the Pyongyang elite. In a 1991 speech to the 
Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Kim Jong Il declared, for example, “Our people take 
great pride and self-confidence in their just cause; they will work to the end to build an ideal 
society for mankind in accordance with their own belief and by their own efforts.”66 
Particularly with regard to Korea’s colonial heritage under Japanese imperialism, it seems 
reasonable that such a vision would find fertile ground within North Korea’s society. The 
traumatic experiences and the nearly exhaustive devastation of the Korean War, combined with a 
deeply rooted anti-American threat perception, appear suitable to have amplified such 
sentiments.  After all, it seems not at all difficult to imagine that such a disillusioned and 
devastated environment laid the ground for Juche as an “eternal truth” and utopian vision of a 
North Korean paradise on earth.67 North Korean defector Kang Chol-hwan recalls the natural 
and self-evident logic from the average person’s viewpoint: “By marrying our singular Korean 
genius with the immutable ideals of the Communist revolution, these two masterminds, these 
two darlings of the universe [Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il], were building for us the Edenic 
socialist state.”68 
                                                 
65 Teuvo Peltoniemi, “Finnish utopian colonies,” http://www.sosiomedia.fi/utopia/english_article.htm 
(accessed May 11, 2008). One example of utopian endeavors to be found in literature are the Finnish Utopian 
Colonies:“The utopian ventures of Finns are in fact much more closely linked to the world history of utopian 
communities than is usually realized. Even though, with the possible exception of Sointula, the Finnish undertakings 
are not mentioned together with More's Utopia, or with Fourier, Owen, Cabet or Oneida, they still have an 
honourable [sic] history reaching back to the 18th century. The two best known utopian colonies founded by Finns 
are Sointula in Canada and Colonia Finlandesa in Argentina. There were, however, almost twenty similar ventures 
in different parts of the world. … Finnish nationalism was a prominent feature of these utopian socialist 
communities. In 1899, nationalist – minded parties seeking refuge from Czarist oppression, planned to establish 
'New Finland' at Red Deer in Alberta, Canada. … The question of utopian colonies is not, however, one of moving 
and travelling as such but one of a spiritual journeying, a restless search for a better world, fit [for] which the actual 
travel on this earth is but a means to an end.” See: For further details on the Finnish Utopian Colonies see: 
Peltoniemi, “Finnish Utopian Settlements in North America,” in Finns in North America, ed. Michael G. Karni, 
Olavi Koivukangas and Edward W. Laine (Institute of Migration C9, Turku, 1988), 
http://www.sosiomedia.fi/utopia/na_settlements.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008). 
66 Kim Jong Il, “For a Free and Peaceful New World.” Juche 80, (1991): 4, http://www.korea-
dpr.com/library/100.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008). 
67 Morgan E. Clippinger, “Kim Chong-il in the North Korean Mass Media: A Study of Semi-Esoteric 
Communication,” Asian Survey 21, no. 3 (March 1981): 302, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2643726.pdf 
(accessed May 11, 2008). “The sayings of Kim Chong-il [Kim Jong-il] are praised as a kind of eternal truth. Nodong 
Ch’ongnyon for over a year carried a special column titled ‘The Great Truth, A Guide for Struggle,’ which 
explained the ‘teachings’ of the Party Center [Party Center is a stylized phrase that refers to Kim Jong – il].”  
68 Kang and Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang, 2. 
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Hence, it seems safe to assess that Juche is indeed a utopian revolutionary idea, capable 
of emotionally appealing to, and mobilizing, the North Korean masses towards the collective 
utopian aim of a better world — North Korea’s “workers’ paradise.”69  
B. JUCHE — NORTH KOREA’S INDIGENOUS ADAPTATION AND 
IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY 
For the purpose at hand, an adequately detailed working definition holds that “political 
ideologies are defined as sets of political values held by individuals regarding the fundamental 
goals of politics.”70 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary indicates that the term ideology has an early 
nineteenth century French origin, describing the science of ideas (ideo– plus –logie). It holds that 
ideology embraces “visionary theorizing;” serves as a “systemic body of concepts,” in particular 
“about human life or culture,” and “a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an 
individual, group, or culture;” and comprises “the integrated assertions, theories and aims that 
constitute a sociopolitical program.”71 Paul M. Johnson emphasizes how ideology, as “a 
comprehensive and coherent set of basic beliefs about political, economic, social and cultural 
affairs,” is utilized for both explaining and prescribing “political strategies and tactics to be 
pursued.”72 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Chinese “political restructuring through 
reform and improvement of democracy within the Party”73 — a soft-footed embrace of 
Capitalism — has left “mass-mobilizing, and ideologically-based” North Korea as the one 
                                                 
69 Eli Lehrer, “News From the Workers' Paradise of North Korea – North Korean leader Kim Jong Il – Brief 
Article,” Insight on the News, (March 1, 1999), 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_8_15/ai_54007875/print (accessed May 11, 2008). 
70 Patrick H. O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2007), 61. 
71 Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “Ideology,” 616. 
72 Paul M. Johnson, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms,” (Department of Political Science, Auburn 
University, 1994-2005), http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/ideology (accessed May 11, 2008). 
73 People’s Daily Online, “Chinese Communist Party undergoes democratic reform to meet challenges,” June 
25, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/25/eng20060625_277173.html (accessed May 11, 2008). “‘The 
CPC would push forward China's political restructuring through reform and improvement of democracy within the 
Party,’ said Li Junru, vice president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee.”  
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remaining, closed authoritarian regime to take Marxism-Leninism seriously.74 After all, “Of all 
former and current communist states in the Asian-Pacific area, Vietnam has expressed the 
clearest commitment to a market economy,” and scores among “the highest GDP growth rates in 
the region” (8.4% in 2005, and 8.1% in 2006).75 Since “economic transition has not, so far, 
induced political transformation,”76 the Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas (BTA) rated 
Vietnam’s “Democracy Status” — on a scale from 1 to 10 — at 3.2, on rank number 112, 
together with China (North Korea holds rank number 120).77 At the same time, Cuba’s 
“Democracy Status” of 3.4 put it on rank number 109, behind the United Arab Emirates (rank 
108), and in front of Iraq (rank 110).78 The BTA forecast a “post-Fidel era” development to “de-
personalize and re-institutionalize Cuban politics,” which should be instrumental to the “socialist 
regime’s functional ability” and “for any future prospects of democratization.”79 Accordingly, 
“the Communist Party, which Fidel increasingly sidelined as an institution in recent years, has 
been returned to political centrality.”80 Overall, under Raúl Castro’s administration, the BTA 
observed a “change from a highly personalized brand of socialism to a more bureaucratic type of 
single party rule,” with no indications “for political liberalization or [an] incipient 
democratization process.”81 
Accordingly, the ideological framework of the North Korean “Stalinist regime”82 has 
received significant scholarly attention. Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig hold that “the North 
Korean brand of ideology has been inflated beyond what was found even in the heyday of Stalin 
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and Mao. Certainly no other country today puts as much effort into the production, elaboration, 
and dissemination of ideology as does North Korea.”83 Swedish diplomat Erik Cornell sums up 
his experience with Pyongyang’s ideological fervor as follows: “It is hard to imagine a more 
totalitarian state. The entire population was permanently mobilized as soldiers, either with 
weapons or with working tools.”84 At the same time, Paul French points out that North Korea’s 
Juche was “developed as an indigenous revolutionary doctrine fusing the basic tenets of 
Marxism-Leninism with elements of Maoism and Confucianism and traditional Korean 
systems… partly an adaptation of the ‘universal truth’ of Marxism-Leninism.”85 Indeed, Kim Il-
sung’s Juche idea embraces fundamental principles in Marxist-Leninist theory. Examples of 
North Korea’s borrowings are its so-called democratic centralism,86 the propagated dictatorship 
of the proletariat,87 and the regime’s Songun (Military First) policy, a variation of the U.S.S.R.’s 
War Communism.88 Similar to Soviet-style Socialism, North Korea puts strong emphasis on 
mass organizations. Akin to Lenin’s metaphor, the “five bodies — the Korean Workers’ Party, 
Party Youth, the Federation of Trade Unions, the Federation of Farmers, and the Women’s 
Union — form the five major ‘transmission belts’ which ensure that the entire population moves 
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complete nationalization, and the introduction of a rationing system to handle supply and distribution; pricing and 
money circulation were also dealt with at the highest state level.”  
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in accordance with the leaders’ will.”89 While supporting the view that elements of Juche are 
traceable to Soviet-style Socialism, French simultaneously underscores its homespun North 
Korean character: “Juche was also an assertion of the DPRK’s independence from the USSR 
after Pyongyang’s refusal to join Comecon.”90 
Accordingly, the preface of the 1998 North Korean constitution affirms that “The 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a socialist fatherland of Juche which embodies the 
idea of and guidance by the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.” Moreover, Article 3 states that 
“The DPRK is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a 
revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people.”91 
In contrast to Marxist dialectical materialism, however, Kim Il-sung’s Juche idea insists 
that the Capitalist development stage could be skipped completely. The North Korean economy 
and society would move directly from a colonial system of feudal tenure to socialist collectivism. 
Thus, Juche constitutes a specific employment of Marxism-Leninism, particularly adapted “to 
Korean reality, a country that had not experienced a capitalist period but that had existed as a 
colony and then been destroyed in the Korean War.”92 French concludes that Kim Il Sung never 
regarded his tailored version of Marxism-Leninism as revisionism, but “rather as an adaption to 
North Korean reality… while Soviet Marxists saw Kim’s reinterpretation of Marxism — 
Leninism as outright heresy.”93 North Korea scholar Bruce Cumings explains the development 
of “Korean communism” as a result of the “political vacuum in Marxism-Leninism” which 
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“opens the way to an assertion of indigenous politics.”94 At the same time, Paul French notes, 
“What set Kim apart from most other leaders of socialist bloc countries was his fiercely 
independent streak, which to a degree accounted for North Korea’s perceived diplomatic 
arrogance and led to the creation and elevation of Juche as the dominant creed of DPRK life.”95 
Consequently, in the late 1970s, secluded from Soviet “Real Existing Socialism” and 
China’s post-Mao democratic reforms, North Korea started cultivating its universalist Juche 
claim: “The Juche idea, our Party’s outlook on the world, is the guiding idea of our times which 
illuminates the absolutely correct way of achieving independence for the popular masses. It is the 
banner of the revolutionary people’s cause of independence and the banner of Socialism.”96 
Juche’s universal aspiration was observed by Swedish diplomat Eric Cornell during his tenure in 
Pyongyang: “The self-assumed role of lead state in the struggle against imperialism provided the 
foundations for a self-righteousness that demanded unswerving loyalty from all ‘progressive’ 
forces.”97 Paul French similarly asserts that Juche “represented Kim Il-sung’s bid to be 
recognized as a prominent — indeed, the pre-eminent — ideological figure in the communist 
world.”98 
Under Kim Jong-il’s aegis — according to an official publication — “in order to 
stimulate solidarity with anti-imperialist forces,” and to expand and develop the “non-aligned 
movement,” North Korea initiated the “study and dissemination of the Juche idea on a global 
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scale.”99 Simultaneously, Kim Jong-il developed his concept of the Juche era and its 
“revolutionary practice… to create a new independent world.”100 With the continuing dilution of 
Soviet Socialism, and China’s opening to reforms, the North Korean regime seemed destined to 
become the world’s vanguard of Socialism. 
Indeed, it can be assessed that the North Korean emphasis on Juche’s ideological roots in 
Marxism-Leninism is an essential strategy to bolster its legitimacy and authority. Though 
Pyongyang portrays the Juche idea as North Korea’s indigenous adaptation, the regime arrogates 
to itself to the same claim of the legitimate authority of a universal and scientific political theory 
that is inherent to Marxism-Leninism. Simultaneously, Kim Il-sung’s cultivation of the role as 
North Korea’s great revolutionary leader bestowed ideological authority and political legitimacy 
— on a par with Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao — upon himself, and eventually upon Kim Jong-
il as his dynastic successor.101  
C. JUCHE – STATE RELIGION AND DEVOUT DYNASTIC CULT 
The 2008 CIA World Factbook describes North Korea’s religious background as 
“traditionally Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christian and syncretic Chondogyo (Religion of 
the Heavenly Way).” The same source adds the following note: “autonomous religious activities 
now almost nonexistent; government-sponsored religious groups exist to provide illusion of 
religious freedom.”102 
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Following a basic definition of a religion, three essential elements are beliefs, rituals, and 
ethics. The respective system of religious belief in a divine being (“superhuman or spiritual”), 
however, as the overarching reference to determine its rituals and ethics, is regarded as the most 
important attribute of a religion. At the same time, the religion’s theology — its narrative, its 
teachings, and its doctrine — provide linkage and guidance for the religious beliefs. “A religion's 
theology is its handbook of beliefs …. Theology is important because it puts a religion's beliefs 
in an order that people can understand.”103 
In the case of North Korea, the overarching and holistic approach of applied Juche 
satisfies all three essential religious requirements: (1) belief in and divine deification of the Great 
Leader and the Dear Leader; (2) enshrined rituals and behavior patterns concerning the 
veneration of these two leaders; and (3) a moral and ethical code, provided by the two Kims’ 
writings, teachings, and “on-the-spot guidance.”104 
With North Korea’s 1998 revised constitution, the late Great Leader Kim Il-sung, four 
years after his death, was anointed “eternal President of the Republic.”105 Thus, Pyongyang’s 
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) effectively declared North Koreans the “disciple[s] of the 
world's only non-living president.”106 At the same time, the SPA accorded Kim Il-sung’s son, 
Kim Jong-il, the nation’s “highest administrative authority” as Chairman of the National Defense 
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Commission.107 An association with the Christian God in heaven and his son Jesus Christ, sent 
earthwards to bless man with salvation, literally seems to obtrude itself and is probably not at all 
accidental. In the wake of Kim Il-sung’s death — some sources report — all over North Korea, 
3,500 “towers of eternal life” have been erected. Since then, Pyongyang allegedly has spent 
“$530 million to erect various monuments” and an estimated total of “at least $890 million 
annually to stage personality cult campaigns.”108 
Similarly, Kim Jong-il’s proclamation of the “Juche Era,”109 decreed after his father’s 
death, might evoke amusement in traditional Western minds. Such amusement, however, misses 
the point that the traditional Christian era of Anno Domini (A.D.) — in the year of the Lord — 
has come to an end in North Korea. Instead, April 15, 1912 marks North Korea’s indigenous 
modification of Anno Domini: the year of the Lord Kim Il-sung. Today, North Korean 
computation of time and date is based on the eternal President’s birthday. 
Accordingly, April 15 is the highest public holiday in North Korea, and “two of the four 
national holidays are the birthdays of Kim Il-song [Kim Il-sung] and Kim Chong-il [Kim Jong-
il].”110 The elder Kim’s birthday is commemorated as the “Day of the Sun.”111 “On such days, 
candy was dispensed to all the kids in the country, sometimes even to those in the camps,” 
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remembers Kang Chol-Hwan, former penal camp inmate and later North Korean defector to 
South Korea.112 Likewise, Helen-Louise Hunter relates: 
North Koreans celebrate Kim’s birthday with extra food rations and new clothes, 
given out once a year on Kim’s birthday to reinforce the idea, taught in nursery 
school, that Kim is the source of all material, as well as spiritual, gifts to the 
people. The children sing songs of praise on receiving their new school 
uniforms.113 
Analogies to the Christian Christmas tradition of giving gifts to loved ones, donating to the 
needy, and singing Christmas carols again seem evident and might not be unintended. Kang 
Chol-Hwan, who later spent a decade of his youth growing up in a North Korean concentration 
camp, recalled his childhood memories accordingly: 
To the child I was, Kim Il-sung was a kind of Father Christmas. Every year on his 
birthday, he would send us gift packages of cakes and sweets. Our beloved 
Number One chose them himself, with a care and kindness that gave his gifts a 
savoriness all their own. Thanks to his generosity, we also had the right, every 
third year, to a school uniform, a cap, and a pair of shoes. … All during my 
childhood, Kim Il-sung had been like a god to me.114 
Likewise, Pyongyang’s official statements employed similarly pompous and messianic 
vocabulary as a rhetorical device. In March 2008, for example, North Korea’s official homepage 
maintained that “The Leaders are the sun of the nation and mankind.” However, in May 2008, on 
a modified D.P.R.K. webpage, the URL was no longer active.115 In the same way, the 
Pyongyang-controlled Korea News Service in Japan reported on “the anti-U.S., anti-fascist 
movement for national salvation with the Juche-based strategy and tactics.”116 Likewise, an 
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ordinary KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) press release reported about “Seminars on the 
immortal exploits of General Secretary Kim Jong Il [which] were held in Russia, Nepal, 
Mongolia and Peru from Feb. 12 to 15 on the occasion of his birthday,” accompanied by 
exhibitions “showing his [Kim Jong-il’s] immortal Songun leadership exploits.”117 In the same 
way, a KCNA report conveyed a message of worldwide relevance and acceptance by giving the 
impression that government officials in Austria devotedly observed February 16 and the “Day of 
the Sun,” and “highly praised Kim Jong Il for the leadership exploits he has performed by 
turning the DPRK into an ideological and military power under the uplifted banner of 
Songun.”118 Overall more than 1,200 honorific titles are officially sanctioned to revere Kim 
Jong-il, “The Lodestar of the Twenty-first Century,” according to Paul French.119 
The daily veneration of the Kims’ teachings and writings extends to a remarkable 
dimension. “The average man’s work day is extended by three or four hours and the average 
woman’s work day by two to three hours for political study.”120 Such “political study” is 
tantamount to Juche study and is usually performed within one’s “unit…the basic social 
grouping of North Korean society.”121 In light of an eight hour work day, six days a week, these 
examples illustrate the “exorbitant amount of time involved in the perpetuation of the cult.”122 In 
fact, it can be assessed that the social grouping into units constitutes a fundamental factor in the 
state’s Juche indoctrination and its utmost Orwellian penetration of society. 
Such descriptions might resonate with recollections of grandparents who grew up in a 
deeply religious age and/or rural society, and who, in their youth, experienced a demanding 
                                                 
117 “Seminars on Exploits of Kim Jong Il Held,” Korean News, News from Korean Central News Agency of 
DPRK, provided by Korea News Service (KNS) in Tokyo, March 1, 2008, Juche 97, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-
e.htm (accessed May 11, 2008). 
118 “February Holiday Celebrated,” Korean News, News from Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, 
provided by Korea News Service (KNS) in Tokyo, March 1, 2008, Juche 97, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm 
(accessed May 11, 2008). 
119 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 67. “… in 1997 the North Koreans took a full-page advert 
in the New York Times to celebrate the rise to power of Kim Jong Il, describing him as ‘The Lodestar of the 
Twenty-first Century’.”  
120 Hunter, Kim Il-Song's North Korea, 33. 
121 Ibid., 37. “It [the unit] can be the school one attends; the factory, collective farm, or government office 
where one works; or the military unit to which one is attached.”  
122 Ibid., 34. 
29 
 
focus on “Ora et Labora” (prayer and work).123 In comparison, not unusually, in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries’ Catholic societies, an early morning matins would start, and an 
evening vesper service would finish, an eight to ten hour work day — six days a week. Although 
matins and vesper services take only fifteen to twenty minutes, in contrast with two to four hours 
of daily Juche study, the resulting dedication to Catholic beliefs and virtues can be regarded as 
quite significant. One can only imagine the effect of much lengthier daily sessions devoted to 
Juche study. 
Referring to Kim Il-sung’s on-the-spot guidance micro-management trips of inspection 
throughout the country, Helen-Louise Hunter reported as follows:124 “Kim’s words of instruction 
on these inspection trips were usually printed in bold-face print or darker print, much like Jesus’ 
words in some editions of the Bible. He was the only person ever directly quoted in North 
Korea.”125 
Surprisingly, Hunter observed, “While they [North Koreans] can — and do — renounce 
the cult intellectually, expressing abhorrence at its excesses, they retain an almost religious 




                                                 
123 Benedictine Sisters Transfiguration Monastery, “Our Benedictine Vows,” (Emmaus, PA), 
http://www.emmausosb.org/vows.html (accessed May 11, 2008). “Ora et Labora” ("Prayer and Work") is the motto 
of the The Order of Saint Benedict. According to the Rule of St Benedict (ch. 58.17), “Benedictine monastics 
promise vows of stability, conversion through the monastic way of life (conversatio) and obedience … Stability is a 
lifelong commitment to the monastic way of life in a particular community. … A disciplined life in a stable 
community, all committed to seeking God provides the setting for pursuing a radical conversion to the reign of God 
known as conversion to the monastic way of life … Obedience is expressed by listening and responding to God's 
daily self-revelation, by participating in monastic authority, by joining the prioress and community members in 
prayerful reflection and decision making, and by acceptance of the authority vested in the prioress by the Rule of 
Benedict.”  
124 Hunter, Kim Il-Song's North Korea, 13.Kim Il Sung’s “personal style of leadership … combined with his 
penchant for on-the-spot guidance, allowed him to become personally familiar with virtually every town and village, 
every factory and farm, in North Korea. Over the years, most North Koreans saw Kim at close hand on one or 
another of his routine visits to their provinces. Kim is reported to have spent an average of from ten to fifteen days 
each year in each of North Korea’s fifteen provinces, making a total of from 150 to 225 days a year outside 
Pyongyang. He is said to have traveled more than 318,000 miles in thirty years, from 1950 to 1980, averaging 
approximately 32 miles a day.”  
125 Ibid., 15. 
126 Ibid., 27. 
30 
 
Another example of the propagated divine nature of the Kim dynasty is the frequent 
reference to the mythology-laden, ancient holy grounds of Mount Paektu, as Kim Il-sung’s 
revolutionary stronghold and the alleged birthplace of his son and successor.127 An official 
D.P.R.K. internet publication declares: 
On February 16, Juche 31 (1942), Kim Jong Il was born in the log cabin under the 
blessing of the whole nation. His birth was a bright sunrise promising the 
completion of the revolutionary cause of Juche started by President Kim Il Sung, 
the glory of Korea and a source of greatest joy to the Korean people.128 
In a Korean Central News Agency press release a Cuban embassy official is allegedly quoted 
after a North Korean government-sponsored visit to Mount Paektu: “Mt. Paektu fully shows the 
greatness, spirit and grit of Kim Il Sung, a great man born of heaven, and Marshal Kim Jong Il, 
the son of Mt. Paektu.”129 Paul French gives a summary of the myth surrounding Kim Jong-il’s 
fabricated birth on Mount Paektu: 
Kim [Jong-il] was reputedly born on Mount Paektu, traditionally Korea’s highest 
and most sacred mountain, where legend has it that Korea came into existence 
5,000 years ago. As he came into the world a new star appeared in the sky, a 
double rainbow appeared, an iceberg on a nearby lake cracked, strange lights 
filled the sky and a swallow passed by overhead to pass on to the world the news 
of his birth.130 
Western scholars, however, maintain unanimously that Kim Jong-il was almost certainly 
born on February 16, 1942 in Siberia, where the Kim family had found refuge from Japanese  
 
 
                                                 
127 “Kim Jong Il’s native home in the Mt. Paektu secret camp,” Naenara, Korea Computer Center in DPR 
Korea, http://www.kcckp.net/en/tourism/attraction/attract-view.php?2+0. (accessed May 11, 2008). “According to 
North Korean propagandists, Kim Jong Il was born in a log cabin on Mount Paekdu, the legendary birthplace of 
Tangun, the mythic father of the Korean people.” Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 346.  “It 
[Mount Paektu] is the sacred mountain and the holy place of the Korean nation for its association with the 
revolutionary history of President Kim Il Sung and for its honour [sic] as being the birthplace of leader Kim Jong 
Il.”  
128 “Kim Jong Il's native home in the Mt.Paektu secret camp,” Naenara, Korea Computer Center in DPR 
Korea. 
129 “Military attaches corps visits Mt. Paektu area,” Korean News, News from Korean Central News Agency of 
DPRK, provided by Korea News Service (KNS) in Tokyo, August 27 1999, Juche 88, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9908/news08/27.htm (accessed May 11, 2008). 
130 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 57. 
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persecution.131 Kong Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig conclude that the creative fabrication around 
Kim Jong-il’s mythical birth on the “‘sacred’ Mount Paektu provides the illusion that he is a gift 
to the Korean people from heaven.”132 
Again, resemblances to Judeo Christian religious belief seem ostentatious. Indeed, the 
North Korean Mount Paektu folklore around the Kim family deeply resonates with biblical 
themes: “When they saw the star, they rejoiced with exceeding great joy.” (Matthew 2:11). 
However, the Bible’s modest description of the Israelites’ Exodus, and their leader Moses 
receiving the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai, combined with elements of the Christian 
nativity gospel and the Star of Bethlehem seem to pale next to the fanciful and pompous 
hodgepodge of the Kim dynasty’s Mount Paektu saga. 
At the same time, the patriarchic leader’s Mandate of Heaven is a traditional Confucian 
concept which widely resonates with legitimacy. Pyongyang’s religious ideology holds that 
North Korea’s ultimate salvation will arrive after Kim Jong-il and Juche bring about the eventual 
defeat of their enemies: the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The ensuing spread of Juche 
across the world — in the North Korean view — will mark the subsequent arrival of paradise on 
earth. 133 By substituting a few nouns, such a message can probably resonate with the doctrines 
of various religions. 
In the meantime, Juche’s religious prominence seems to receive more and more 
concerned recognition. A 2006 publication of Voice Of Martyrs (VOM), an Oklahoma-based 
evangelical organization — covertly proselytizing in North Korea — subtly acknowledges 
Juche’s religious status by labeling it “a false trinity consisting of Kim Il Sung, the … ‘father;’ 
Kim Jong Il, the … ‘son;’ and the ‘holy fire’ of Juche ideology.”134 Michigan State University’s 
Asian Studies Center arrives at a similar conclusion, stating that “Juche and the veneration of the 
                                                 
131 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 57. 
132 Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, 120. 
133 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 49. 
134 Todd P. Nettleton, “They All Went Back.” VOM, The Voice of the Martyrs, Newsletter, October 2006, 
http://webdirect604.com/VOMSO/PDF/VOM_Oct_Newsletter_NKArticle.pdf (accessed May 11, 2008). VOM - 
The Voice of the Martyrs “is a non-profit, interdenominational organization with a vision for aiding Christians 
around the world who are being persecuted for their faith in Christ, fulfilling the Great Commission, and educating 
the world about the ongoing persecution of Christians. VOM is headquartered in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, with thirty 
affiliated international offices, and an enormous team of servant-hearted volunteers.“ 
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two ‘Leaders’ is a religious phenomenon.”135 Of similar significance is the earlier discussed 
reference to Juche, as the world’s number ten religion, published by Adherents.com:136 
It is true that Juche has only a nominal presence outside of North Korea. But it 
has so many adherents, is so influential in their lives, and is so different from any 
other religious system, that including it on this list may be necessary in order to 
accurately reflect the total world religious economy. As with the other religions 
listed here, inclusion on this list does not constitute endorsement, merely 
recognition of Juche as a statistically significant distinct religion. … While we 
recognize there may be validity in continued classification of Juche as a highly 
"heretical" subset of Communism or general secularism, it seems that, on balance, 
to do so today is no more accurate than continuing to classify Buddhism as a 
Hindu sect.137 
At the same time, David Henke — the Watchman Fellowship’s Founder and Chairman of 
the Board138 — in an essay on “The use of Mind Control in Religious Cults,” concludes that the 
North Korean regime’s ideology amounts to “religious cultism.”139 Similarly, Christopher M. 
Centner, a senior intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), has observed 
that, “When compared to the attributes of a cult, North Korea slides easily into the definition.”140 
By means of a nine point checklist, derived from theological characteristics and commonly 
                                                 
135 “North Korean Religion,” Windows on Asia, (Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University), 
http://asia.msu.edu/eastasia/NorthKorea/religion.html (accessed May 11, 2008) 
136 Adherents.com, “Major Religions of the World.”  
137 Adherents.com, “Discussion of why Juche is classified as a major world religion,” 
http://www.adherents.com/largecom/Juche.html (accessed May 12, 2008), (“so many” in bold print in the original 
for emphasis). 
138 David Henke, “The Watchman Fellowship,” 
http://www.watchman.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.bio_dhenke (accessed May 11, 2008). “David Henke 
founded Watchman Fellowship in 1979. He chose to pursue this ministry full time in 1978, leaving his previous 
career as an educator. David shaped the missionary philosophy and methodology of Watchman Fellowship through 
its first sixteen years as its President. He now guides and oversees it as the Board Chairman. Rev. Henke specializes 
in the field of Jehova’s Witnesses and issues of mind control, spiritual abuse, and legalism. His heart is tender 
toward those who continue to suffer from the effects of being in bondage to false spiritual systems. Working with 
these individuals and groups is one of David's passions.” “Watchman Fellowship is an independent Christian 
research and apologetics ministry focusing on new religious movements, cults, the occult and the New Age… 
Watchman Fellowship serves the Christian and secular community as a resource for education, counseling, and non-
coercive intervention and evangelism training. We accomplish these tasks through our church presentations, our 
magazines (The Watchman Expositor and The Vantage Point), personal counseling, this website, and other 
activities. We have served almost every denomination including Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal, 
Assemblies of God, Church of God, Lutheran, Nazarene, etc., as well as schools, law enforcement agencies, and 
civic groups.”  
139 Henke, “The use of Mind Control in Religious Cults (Part Two),” 
http://www.watchman.org/cults/usemindcontrol2.htm (accessed May 11, 2008). 
140 Christopher M. Centner, “The Cult That Is North Korea,” Cultic Studies Review 1, no. 3 (2002), 




utilized to analyze cultic organizations, Centner deduces that “Juche and the worship of Kim 
Jong-Il match almost perfectly with those attributes expected to be found in a cult.” However, 
due to “Pyongyang’s fundamentally hostile worldview and its fanatical, resolutely 
uncompromising Kim-focus doctrine,” Centner further assesses that “North Korea matches the 
pattern of the most violent cults.”141 Former CIA analyst Helen-Louise Hunter, in her 1999 
sociological study on North Korea, arrived at a similarly meaningful conclusion: “the Kim cult 
may prove to be one of the most remarkable cults of all time.”142 
Paul French, however, connects the personality cult to the Juche ideology: “Although 
other major personality cults in the socialist world have been similar to that in North Korea, 
arguably none has been so total and complete as in the DPRK, or has had such blatant theoretical 
justifications as those enshrined in Juche.”143 Australian Korea scholar Andrei Lankov concurs 
and points out that “the decision to introduce the Juche Era was just one of several 
manifestations of Kim Il Sung’s posthumous ‘personality cult.’”144 
The extreme scope of the cult is explained by the “state’s total control of the media — 
everything from the mass rallies held to mark anniversaries of one of the Kims’ birth or the Great 
Leader’s death to popular songs that extol the Kims.”145 On the other hand, the cult’s deep 
penetration is achieved by “extend[ing] the cult into the private realm.”146 
Paul French condenses the argument: “The first decades of the existence of the DPRK 
saw Kim Il-sung’s personality cult grow, first to secure power, then to motivate the population, 
and finally to dominate the country. The cult was then effectively enshrined in Juche.”147 
                                                 
141 Centner, “The Cult That Is North Korea.” For a detailed summary of social-structural, social-psychological, 
and interpersonal behavioral patterns as an “analytical tool” to assess a cultic environment, see: Janja Lalich and 
Michael D. Langone, “Characteristics Associated with Cultic Groups – Revised,” 
http://www.csj.org/infoserv_cult101/checklis.htm (accessed May 11, 2008). 
142 Hunter, Kim Il-Song's North Korea, 24. 
143 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 48. 
144 Lankov, North of the DMZ, 10. 
145 French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula, 67. 
146 Ibid. “The universal lapel badges, worn next to the heart, and the portraits of the Kims that hang in every 
household to show that the Great Leader and the Dear Leader effectively watch over every family in the land, extend 
the cult into the private realm.”  
147 Ibid., 49. 
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D. CONCLUSION: JUCHE – A FUNDAMENTALIST STATE BELIEF-SYSTEM 
This examination of North Korea’s Juche idea strongly suggests that it holds distinctive 
elements of utopian, ideological, and religious paradigms.  Though today’s conception of 
modern secular states separates religion from political ideology, a 2007 textbook on comparative 
politics observes that “ideologies and religions are in many ways similar, with their assertions 
about the fundamental nature of humans and society, the key to a good life and an ideal 
community, a host of core texts and prophets, and a promise of salvation.”148 
Juche’s utopian appeal of a “collective impulse towards a better place,”149 its all-
embracing set of ideological “political values” concerning the “fundamental goals of politics,”150 
and its religious culture of deifying its leaders and of practicing their moral codes, all qualify the 
Juche idea as a utopian and comprehensively religious and ideological framework. 
Accordingly, since North Korea’s religious and political leadership is fused into a single 
sovereign authority under the umbrella of Juche, the conclusion seems warranted that the Kim 
dynasty fits the definition of a theocracy — the “‘rule by God,’ where the officially sanctioned 
faith is the foundation for the entire political regime.”151 
Moreover, the evidence examined so far suggests that Juche is not merely a utopian 
ideological state religion. Indeed, the North Korean Juche idea involves “the fusion of religion 
and politics into an ideology that seeks to merge religion and the state.”152 In fact, Juche appears 
to fit the textbook definition of Fundamentalism. 
According to Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, Fundamentalism derives from “a movement 
in 20th century Protestantism emphasizing the literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to  
 
                                                 
148 O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 65. 
149 Lucy Sargisson, “Religious fundamentalism and utopianism in the 21st century,” Journal of Political 
Ideolgies 12, no. 3 (October 1, 2007): 272, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 9, 2008). 
150 O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 62. “Political Ideologies Are… Sets of political values regarding 
the fundamental goals of politics…”  
151 Ibid., 128. 
152 O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 128. “… fundamentalism, which we defined as the fusion of 
religion and politics into an ideology that seeks to merge religion and the state.” Also, Ibid., 68. “… fundamentalism 




Christian life and teaching.” Fundamentalism describes “the beliefs of this movement… [or] 
adherence to such beliefs… [or] a movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherence to a 
set of basic principles.”153 
Similarly, British scholar Lucy Sargisson, in her 2007 work on Religious 
Fundamentalism and Utopianism in the 21st Century, found that: 
The key that helps us to unravel all of the [sic] lies in the [respective religious] 
group’s attitudes to its core beliefs. All of the scholarship in this field points 
towards this. The key factor in identifying fundamentalism is the core – the 
fundamentals, which are perceived to be in danger… This core is found in a pure 
and inerrant sacred text (usually this is a written text but sometimes it consists of 
a collection of stories or utterances by / about a sacred person or divinity…).154 
Sargisson further described a fundamentalist group’s opposition to individualism in favor of 
collectivism, and the need for “doctrinal discipline…fundamentalist dogmatism,” a “strong 
internal hierarchy,” and “codes of behavior.”155 As a “key defining feature of fundamentalism,” 
she identified its claim for “absolute rightness” and “righteousness.”156 While Lucy Sargisson 
utilized Osama bin Laden’s jihad to illustrate the characteristics of Fundamentalism, existing 
parallels to North Korea’s Juche idea are stunning. With a worldview similar in this respect to 
that of Muslim Fundamentalists, North Korea perceives external threats “to the core of its belief 
system.”157 At the same time, Juche — through its indigenous strain of Communism, enriched 
with traditional Confucian elements — “seek[s] also to revive, re-imagine or conserve an 
existing tradition.”158 While Bin Laden’s “jihad stems from a critical view of Western values 
                                                 
153 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “Fundamentalism,” 507. 
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155 Ibid., 273-274. 
156 Ibid., 279. 
157 Ibid., 275. Also, Kim Jong Il, “On Some Problems of the Ideological Foundation of Socialism,” (speech 
delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, May 30, 1990), 
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and also a critique of ‘corrupt’ Muslim practices and regimes,”159 Pyongyang’s Juche idea 
claims to be a similar vanguard for Communism and non-aligned countries, which are in 
opposition to “the imperialists and the U.S.”160 In as much as U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia — 
stationed and “immorally invited” by the Royal Saudi family — are regarded by some 
fundamentalist Muslims as “a blasphemous occupation of sacred space,”161 North Korean 
rhetoric towards the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula resonates likewise.162 
Muslim fundamentalists call for “Rigorous Qur’anic observance” as “the path to a better world, 
combined with political activity which is extrapolated from this core of beliefs and practices.”163 
Similar views are articulated in North Korea: 
As we have the Juche idea, we have solved with credit the problem of 
consolidating the ideological foundation of socialism. If we had not the Juche idea 
or had we blindly followed others, we would not have been able to build our 
unique form of socialism which is the most advantageous in the world.164 
Indeed, the presented evidence and existing parallels with indisputably Fundamentalist 
Muslim belief systems strongly suggest that North Korean Juche falls in the same category. 
Consequently, this chapter’s conclusion that Juche is a Fundamentalist North Korean merger of  
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religious and state ideology under the theocratic rule of the Kim dynasty has a significant impact 
on the following discussion of socio-cultural issues in the Korean and the comparative German 
cases. 
North Korea’s Fundamentalism is clearly relevant to the analysis in the final chapter as to 
whether Juche could offer inter-Korean common ground or rather function as an ideological 
barrier upon eventual Korean national unification. 
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III. THE COMPARATIVE GERMAN CASE: FROM EUPHORIA TO 
DISILLUSIONMENT? 
To provide the analytical basis for a subsequent investigation of the prospective impact of 
socio-cultural issues upon an eventual Korean reunification, this chapter examines the 
experiences and outcomes of the German reunification case. 
It could be argued, however, that the German and Korean cases have too little in common 
to allow a meaningful comparison. These nations are situated in decidedly different regions, with 
diverse political, cultural and historical backgrounds and environments. Projecting Germany’s 
socio-cultural experiences and challenges in reunification onto the Korean peninsula might 
therefore appear to be a superficial charade. However, despite the putative discrepancies between 
the two, the German and Korean cases share significant commonalities. 
Both nations were divided as a result of the Second World War. The separated halves had 
been firmly aligned with the respective hegemons of the East-West conflict during the Cold War. 
The result was a strong and successful economy within a liberal parliamentary democracy in 
West Germany, and eventually also in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K./South Korea).165 In 






                                                 
165 The Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), also known as West Germany, differed from the ROK in that 
the F.R.G. was integrated into an array of multinational Euro-Atlantic institutions that have no equivalent in East 
Asia. The German term Westintegration can be traced back to the F.R.G.’s first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer 
(1949-1963), and his concept of combining a transatlantic commitment with integrating the F.R.G. into the Western 
community of states. Hallmarks of the F.R.G.’s Westintegration were: joining the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951, admittance to the Western European Union (WEU) and to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1955, membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and in the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1958, and the 1963 Franco-German Élysée Treaty. 
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political economy.166 Within its progressive Realexistierender Sozialismus,167 the G.D.R. 
developed into an obedient Soviet client and a fully integrated member of the Eastern bloc. At 
the same time, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K./North Korea) initially 
leaned towards the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and subsequently towards the People’s Republic of 
China (P.R.C.). Eventually, the Pyongyang regime chose to pursue a non-alignment policy, 
based on the Juche idea’s notion of self-reliance and independence from international 
entanglement — however, not without relying heavily on economic aid and support from both 
the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. Hence, the presence of mutually opposed Socialist and Capitalist 
societies and economies in both the German and the Korean states underlines the relevance and 
applicability of the comparison. 
An initial review assesses how and to what extent socio-cultural reunification has been 
achieved in the German case. Actual obstacles, drivers, and their limitations in the movement 
towards an inner unity and a socio-cultural coherence of the two previously divided German 
societies are identified. Subsequently, this chapter concentrates on the roots and effects of the 
German issues known as the “Unification Crisis” or the “Wall Inside The Minds.” The 
concluding portion of this chapter consolidates the socio-cultural issues potentially applicable to 
both the German and the Korean cases in order to build a bridge towards the next chapter’s 
analysis of how and to what extent factors similar to those in Germany are present in and 
applicable to today’s Korean societies. 
                                                 
166 O'Neil, Essentials of Comparative Politics, 199. In a Communist political economy, “Markets and property 
are wholly absorbed by the state. Central planning replaces the market mechanism. Individual property rights, 
individual profit, unemployment, competition between firms, and bankruptcy are all virtually eliminated. Most of 
the nation’s means of production are nationalized. The economy functions in essence as a single large firm, with the 
public as its sole employees. The state provides extensive public goods and services, including universal systems of 
public education, health care, and retirement.”  
167 The term Realexistierender Sozialismus (real existing Socialism) was introduced by Soviet propaganda in 
the 1970s to designate the more open forms of government that had evolved in several Communist countries. The 
term was often used in order to differentiate traditional, conventional (or ideal) Socialism from de facto Socialism 
existing in the Eastern bloc countries. Real referred to the fact that in reality, not all utopian principles of Socialism 
and Communism could be implemented immediately. Accordingly, in the real world, the real existing Socialism 
would only be an interim arrangement before establishing the ideal, Socialist society. The anti-Communist 
opposition used the term in a sense of ironic criticism. Other Communist regimes charged that such a watered down 
version of socialism compromised and betrayed Communism, and consequently chose to relax their alignment with 
the Soviet Union (e.g., the Democratic Republic of North Korea, D.P.R.K.). 
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A. HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HAS GERMAN SOCIO-CULTURAL 
RE-UNIFICATION BEEN ACHIEVED? 
On October 3, 1990, the majority of the citizens of the former German Democratic 
Republic (G.D.R./East Germany) were building high hopes on the outcome of German national 
reunification.168 They were looking forward to bright prospects in a democratically free and 
economically flourishing unified Germany. Only a few, still loyal to the failed Stalinist concept 
of “real existing Socialism,” had a negative outlook and feared an uncertain future. Today, nearly 
two decades and an estimated 1.5 trillion Euro after German reunification, the situation is 
significantly different.169 A considerable chasm between East and West Germans can still be 
seen, and it seems likely to persist well into the future. The Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 
maintains that seventeen years after political reunification, Germany’s society is still far from 
being a cohesive, integrated community.170 To this date, unified Germany comprises two distinct 
economic regions, discrete labor markets, varied wage and pay scale zones, and two distinct 
individual, social, and communal value systems in East and West Germany.171 Jens Bisky labels 
                                                 
168 3 October 1990 is the date of formal German reunification, and it is observed as a national holiday. 
169 Han Aran, “Term ‘reunification cost’ inappropriate,” Korea.net, October 31, 2007, 
http://www.korea.net/News/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20071026027 (accessed May 12, 2008). The total cost 
of German reunification has been estimated to account for up to 1.5 trillion Euro (equal to more than $ 2.35 trillion 
in March 2008 ).  
170 Volkssolidarität e.V, http://www.volkssolidaritaet.de/cms/Wir+%C3%BCber+uns-p-2.html. 
Volkssolidarität e.V. is a non-profit welfare organization that was founded in East Germany in 1945. Its purpose was 
to mitigate the post-World War II social destitution, individual affliction, and other resulting hardships. Today, it 
brings together individuals and groups who need or who can provide help and support on the base of social 
solidarity. Its members and associates support the collective experience of shaping and reshaping social and 
communal solidarity, particularly among East Germans, while simultaneously promoting and facilitating social 
rapprochement and convergence between East and West Germans. Apart from maintaining social services and 
facilities offering help and support in everyday life, Volkssolidarität e.V. aims to represent the socio-political 
interests of minorities and of the weakest members of society in order to promote social equity and the 
harmonization of living conditions in East and West Germany. Volkssolidarität e.V. regularly commissions the 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum (SFZ) Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. to compile the Sozialreport, a report 
on the social situation in East Germany. Also, Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum (SFZ) Berlin-
Brandenburg e.V, http://www.sfz-bb.de/Ziele/index.htm (accessed May 14, 2008). Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Forschungszentrum (SFZ) Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. is a non-profit research organization, founded by East and West 
German social scientists and scholars, with international participation. It describes itself as a product of and a forum 
for East-West German and international cooperation, aimed at East-West German, European, and international 
integration. The emphasis of its scholarly interest and its research is on the social aspects of societal transformation 
to complement the traditionally economy- and technology-focused conceptions of progress, development, and 
advancement. It aims to provide a theoretical and practical framework for social modernization that is oriented along 
practical and realistic dimensions of mastering future challenges and opportunities.  
171 Gunnar Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006; Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern,” 
Volkssolidarität Bundesverband e.V. Berlin: Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg e.V, 
December 2006, http://www.sfz-bb.de/Aktuelles/sozialreport2006/sr2006.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008), 25. 
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German unity a “Fata Morgana,” a mirage over the abyss divorcing the country.172 In his view, 
which is supported by O.E.C.D. data, two-thirds of Germany’s economic struggle since 1990 can 
be attributed to the huge West-East transfer payments, rather than to an anemic economy in the 
realm of globalization and unbridled capitalism. Instead of blooming landscapes in the East 
(“blühende Landschaften”173), the results have been a dangerously unstable society, and an 
economy which is heavily dependent on financial transfers and subsidies.174 Unsurprisingly, in 
2006, 15% of East Germans felt sufficiently aggrieved to claim that they wanted the G.D.R. 
back, while only 22% were content to identify with the Federal Republic of Germany and its 
political, economic, and socio-cultural structures. At the same time, a 63% majority stated that 
they did not identify themselves as F.R.G. citizens yet, but neither would they want to have the 
G.D.R. back. Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 holds the enduring deficiencies in integrating 
the East German population responsible for such sobering findings.175 
B. OBSTACLES, DRIVERS, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS TOWARDS AN INNER 
UNITY AND A SOCIO-CULTURAL COHERENCE OF THE TWO 
PREVIOUSLY DIVIDED GERMAN SOCIETIES. 
To this day, socio-cultural issues of varying intensity characterize mutual perceptions and 
relations between citizens of the former two Germanys, and stand in the way of societal unity 
and national cohesion. In the wake of German unification and its concurrent political, economic, 
social, and cultural upheavals, most East Germans have witnessed their accustomed environment 
                                                 
172 Jens Bisky, Die deutsche Frage: Warum die Einheit unser Land gefährdet (Berlin: Rowohlt), 13.“Fünfzehn 
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G.D.R. state-run broadcast service’s youth program. Subsequently, he earned a Master’s degree in cultural studies 
and German studies and was a journalist for the Berliner Zeitung. Currently, Jens Bisky is an editor for the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung. Interestingly, his father, Lothar Bisky, had emigrated from West Germany to the G.D.R. in 
1959 and had subsequently pursued a career in academia. After German reunification, he went into politics for the 
PDS, the legatee party of the G.D.R. regime’s Sozialistische Deutsche Einheitspartei (SED). Recently, the newly 
established party Die Linke, a left-wing alliance for democratic Socialism, named Lothar Bisky one of its two 
chairmen in 2007. 
173 Helmut Kohl, “Fernsehansprache des Bundeskanzlers am 1. Juli 1990,” (Chancellor Kohl’s television 
address to the German nation on July 1, 1990), http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=555 (accessed May 12, 
2008). 
174 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 45.“Die deutsche Wachstumsschwäche ist nach OECD-Berechnungen zu zwei 
Dritteln auf die Sonderleistungen für den Aufbau Ost zurückzuführen. Der aber, das größte und teuerste 
Unternehmen der Bundesrepublik ist gescheitert, die Annäherung beider Landesteile misslungen. In den neuen 
Ländern entstanden eine transferabhängige Wirtschaft und eine gefährlich labile Gesellschaft.”  
175 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 26 and fig. 7.2. 
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and framework of values crumble. At the same time, many lost their initially euphoric sense of 
security and confidence in the new Western order. High expectations regarding the capabilities 
of West Germany’s Social Market Economy,176 and the quality of its social safety net, combined 
with elation about the much longed for virtues of democracy, consumerism and free travel, 
gradually gave way to disillusionment, frustration, and angst. As a considerable number of East 
Germans feel that they have been “losers” in the unification process, they often feel singled out 
as second class citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.177 Many consider themselves as 
“Absteiger”178 (that is, someone who is descending) and identify themselves as members of the 
“second deceived generation.”179 
Jürgen Kocka provides an account of East Germany’s post-unification Westernization 
and its economic ramifications. He explains that the drastic transition, modernization, and 
streamlining of the East German economy triggered an equally sweeping decline in employment 
in conjunction with a change in employment patterns and structures in the East German states.180 
Between 1989 and 1992 the total number of available jobs in East Germany was reduced by 34% 
from 9.3 to 6.2 million. Even more impressive are Kocka’s figures about the decay and change 
                                                 
176 In order to mitigate the social consequences of unbridled capitalism, the Federal Republic of Germany 
adopted its Social Market Economy concept (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) in 1947. Accordingly, it is the government’s 
responsibility to achieve social accommodation through state intervention and facilitate a balance between a high 
rate of economic growth, low inflation, low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, strong social 
welfare, and extensive public services. It has achieved significant successes and is today considered the basis of 
Germany’s social contract and its economic and social order. However, in an era of globalization, the range and 
amount of state intervention in the market economy, and the future sustainability of the Social Market Economy are 
being discussed. 
177 Na. Presseportal, “N24-EMNID-UMFRAGE: Ostdeutsche fühlen sich immer noch benachteiligt,” news 
aktuell. October 1, 2007. http://www.presseportal.de/pm/13399/1058281/n24/rss (accessed May 12, 2008). An 
October 2007 survey commissioned by the German news service N24 established that East Germans prevalently feel 
like second class citizens. Indeed, 74% of East Germans regard themselves as aggrieved and disadvantaged with 
regard to their fellow citizens in the West.  
178 Jürgen A. K. Thomanek, “From Euphoria to Reality; Social Problems of Post-Unification,” in The New 
Germany Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of Unification, ed. John R. P. McKenzie and Derek Lewis 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 28. Thomanek cites a 1993 opinion poll which found that “some 35% [of 
East Germans] believed they had become Absteiger, that is, their social status had declined; this group included 
mainly women, those over forty, former managers, and the unemployed. Only 13% felt that they were Aufsteiger, 
that is, their status had risen.” [An Aufsteiger is someone who is ascending, advancing in status and position].  
179 Ibid., 20. Germany’s World War II generation is commonly described as the deceived generation. Due to 
the traumatic upheaval in the wake of World War II and the ensuing poverty during the rebuilding of Germany, 
members of this generation have felt defrauded of their youth, their lives, and of their right to pursue wealth and 
happiness. Many East Germans today refer to themselves as the “second deceived generation in twentieth century 
German history, a generation that grew up in the GDR and believed in the ideals of socialism.”  




of the traditional East German economy and its employment structure. The number of jobs in 
East Germany’s agricultural sector, for example, dropped by 70%, from 920,000 in 1989 to a 
mere 280,000 in 1992. Similar data characterize East Germany’s industrial sector. Here, the 
number of employees declined by 60%, from 3.17 million in 1989 to 1.29 million in 1992. Even 
the service sector, including government administration, saw a regression of 22%, from 4.35 
million to 3.41 million jobs.181 Kocka summarized the significant socio-cultural impact of such 
drastic change and upheaval on East German society in euphemistic terms: “More than half of 
the [East German] population has switched their professions or at least their positions since 
1990. Social mobility — up, down, or offset horizontally — has become a mass experience.”182 
It may be significant that the officially elected ugliest word of the year in 2005 was 
“Entlassungsproduktivität” (layoff-productivity), a neologism to describe a company’s profit 
from increased productive efficiency due to firing its numerous redundant employees.183 
C. “UNIFICATION CRISIS” AND THE “WALL INSIDE THE MINDS” — ROOTS 
AND EFFECTS 
As early as 1995, West German historian Jürgen Kocka had identified typical differences 
in East and West German value systems. East German citizens were found to attribute higher 
value to traditional virtues such as obedience, orderliness, modesty, cleanliness, and to a sense of 
duty, than West Germans. At the same time they were found to have higher expectations 
regarding the state and to be less inclined to hedonistic, post-materialistic, and individualistic 
attitudes than West Germans. 
Most prominent, however, was the difference in the importance of work and labor in the 
two German value systems. While speculating that the East Germans’ internalization of 
traditional German virtues makes them the more typical Germans, Kocka points out that 
                                                 
181 Jürgen Kocka, Vereinigungskrise: Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Reprecht, 
1995), 142. 
182 Ibid. “Mehr als die Hälfte der Bevölkerung hat seit 1990 den Beruf oder doch die Stellung gewechselt, 
soziale Mobilität ist eine Massenerfahrung geworden – nach oben, nach unten oder seitlich versetzt.” 
183 Unwort des Jahres, Informationen zu einer sprachkritischen Aktion, http://www.unwortdesjahres.org/ 
(accessed May 12, 2008). Unwort des Jahres 2005: Entlassungsproduktivität (Gewinne aus Produktionsleistungen 
eines Unternehmens, nachdem zuvor zahlreiche für „überflüssig“ gehaltene Mitarbeiter entlassen wurden).  
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employment and labor carry more relevance for East Germans than for West Germans.184 
Kocka’s analysis resonates with Jürgen Thomanek’s explanation of the significance of work for 
the individual in the Socialist system: “a basic tenet of Marxist ideology holds that human beings 
realized [sic] their full potential through creative work.”185 Both Kocka and Thomanek 
underscore that East Germans define themselves more significantly via their labor and 
employment status than do West German citizens. These distinctions may be related to more 
profound differences in attitudes towards work in Catholic and Protestant Germans. Konrad 
Adenauer’s Rhenish Catholicism has been contrasted with the Reformationist Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism, to cite the title of Max Weber’s famous book. In the Protestant 
outlook, industriousness was regarded as a virtue and work as a commission in the name of 
God.186 It is worth recalling that the population of the G.D.R. was predominantly Protestant, 
while West Germany included mainly Catholic regions such as Bavaria and the Rhineland. 
However, regardless of ideologies or different levels of individual identification through 
labor and employment, the importance of work and accomplishing a task is widely regarded as of 
essential significance in a person’s life. For example, according to a 2006 British government 
publication, “For individuals and families, the benefits of work are clear…It strengthens 
                                                 
184 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 146. “Für manchen Beobachter erscheinen die Ostdeutschen als die typischeren 
Deutschen, insofern sie tiefer in älteren deutschen Traditionen verwurzelt sind … .”  
185 Thomanek, “From Euphoria to Reality,” 12. 
186 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2003), 264, quoting German Lutheran theologian Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760), who 
maintained that “One does not only work in order to live, but one lives for the sake of one's work, and if there is no 
more work to do one suffers or passes away.” (“Man arbeitet nicht allein, dass man lebt, sondern man lebt um der 
Arbeit willen, und wenn man nichts mehr zu arbeiten hat, so leidet man oder entschläft.”)  Interestingly, the German 
word Beruf denotes a vocation or calling (Berufung – appointment/calling), rather than merely a profession, 
occupation, career or a job. This attitude toward work might reflect the Protestant ethic. For the German original see 
Max Weber. “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur 
Religionssoziologie I (Tübingen 1988), 171. In contrast, German Roman Catholic philosopher Josef Pieper holds 
that work is not an end in itself but aims at the happiness of existence in a life of worship. Josef Pieper, Leisure, the 
Basis of Culture (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 1998). From a Thomistic outlook, Pieper defends “occupied 
leisure” as a necessary supplement to the world of work. In his view, culture and leisure both are essential 
prerequisites for man’s fulfillment. Accordingly, Pieper promotes the notion of “de-proletarization” (p. 39), to 
liberate today’s individual from his work-focused life and in order to provide for a richer and more fulfilling 
existence. Josef Pieper’s views are naturally opposed to the Communist ideology. “The total working state needs the 
spiritually impoverished functionary, while such a person is inclined to see and embrace an ideal of a fulfilled life in 
the total ‘use’ made of his ‘services’” (p. 43).  
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independence and dignity. It builds family aspirations, fosters greater social inclusion and can 
improve an individual’s health and wellbeing.”187  
Accordingly, in the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006, a mere 8% of East German 
interviewees expressed a primarily hopeful attitude towards a positive future, while 38% 
primarily felt apprehension and concern for their personal outlook.188 Additionally, while four 
out of five East Germans articulated partial or complete discontent and frustration with their 
future prospects, only one out of five saw satisfactory future prospects for his personal situation. 
In its traditional turn of the year 2006 survey, the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD)189 
found distinct developments and “climatic zones” of optimism in East and West Germany.190 
From 2004 to 2006, East German hopefuls had increased by 7 percentage points to 42% (35% in 
2004), while the West German optimists had increased by 12 percentage points to 51% (39% in 
2004).191 According to the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 data from 1994 to 2006, the 
degree of discontent of East German citizens regarding their future prospects reached a historical 
high with the 2005/2006 data. From 2000 to 2006, the East German contentment quota dropped 
more than half, from 42% to 20%.192 Correspondingly, a 2006 Leipzig University study found a 
noteworthy difference in contentedness between East and West Germans, especially with regard 
to income and career. On a zero to ten scale East Germans rated their income contentedness at 
3.80 (career contentedness: 3.95), while West Germans deemed theirs significantly higher at 6.12 
                                                 
187 United Kingdom, Department for Work and Pensions, “A New Deal For Welfare: Empowering People to 
Work,” (CM 6730, London, January 2006), http://www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/docs/A_new_deal_for_welfare-
Empowering_people_to_work-Full_Document.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008), 2. 
188 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 8. 
189 The Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach – Gesellschaft zum Studium der öffentlichen Meinung mbH (IfD) 
has been one of (West) Germany’s most renowned polling institutes since 1947. It is rated to be within the 
conservative spectrum and generally focuses on media, political, social, and market research. Traditionally, the 
institute has conducted its turn of the year study to form an impression of German citizens‘ optimism for the New 
Year as an economic and business trend indicator. Since 1949, the question has been: "Sehen Sie dem neuen Jahr 
mit Hoffnungen oder Befürchtungen entgegen?" (Are you facing the New Year with hopes or with apprehensions?). 
190 Berichte Allensbacher, “ZUM JAHRESWECHSEL: Die Stimmung in der Bevölkerung hat sich weiter 
verbessert,” Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, Gesellschaft zum Studium der öffentlichen Meinung mbH. Nr. 20 / 
2006 (December 2006). http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/pdf/prd_0620.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008), 2-3. “Neben der 
allgemeinen Stimmungsverbesserung in der Bevölkerung zeigt sich zugleich aber auch, daß sich in Deutschland … 
zwei Klimazonen entwickeln. Denn die Entwicklung zu mehr Optimismus verläuft in Ostdeutschland sehr viel 
langsamer als in Westdeutschland.”  
191 Ibid. 
192 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 9. 
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(career contentedness: 6.31).193 This decrease in hope and confidence for the future, 
accompanied by growing discontent among East Germans, seems profoundly perturbing. It is 
testimony to a reduced quality of social engagement and a reduced quality of life for individual 
citizens. Its implications for Germany’s political system, institutions, economy, and civil society 
could be devastating and lay the ground for conflict, extremism, and the reemergence of 
anachronistic political currents. While some observers have advocated consolidating the 
legitimacy of democracy and the market economy by educating East German citizens in the 
appreciation of these values,194 the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 makes the point that — 
apart from tangible, actual living conditions and contentedness in society — a society’s quality is 
characterized by the individual’s future perspectives and his personal perception of future 
prospects, possibilities and opportunities.195 
Further, Kocka reasons that the G.D.R.’s inherited traditional socialist structures of 
repression and paternalistic providence left East German society ill-prepared for the rapid 
Westernization endeavor. Flexibility and swift transition, competition and persistence in 
uncertainty, and aggressive, energetic exploitation of opportunities in light of odds and risks had 
                                                 
193 Elmar Brähler and Oliver Decker, “Deutsche Befindlichkeiten – Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Befragung 
in Ost- und Westdeutschland 2006,” Selbständige Abteilung für Medizimische Psychologie und Medizinische 
Soziologie der Universität Leipzig. (May/June 2006), http://medpsy.uniklinikum-
leipzig.de/pdf/deutsche_befindlichkeiten_2006.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008), 10 and 11, fig.6. “Lediglich in den 
Bereichen Wohnung, Familien und Partnerschaft gibt es keine deutlichen Ost- West-Unterschiede. In allen anderen 
Bereichen is die Lebenszufriedenheit im Osten deutlich geringer, vor allem in den Bereichen Einkommen und 
Beruf.”  
194 Detlef Pollack, “Wie ist es um die innere Einheit Deutschlands bestellt?” Das Parlament mit der Beilage 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Nr.30-31, 24 July 2006. Deutscher Bundestag und Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2006/30-31/beilage/001.html (accessed May 12, 2008). A 2006 
essay on German inner unity reported the views of delegates of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung after a recent 
conference with social scientists on the assessment of political culture in the former East Germany. While the social 
scientists’ judgment was inconclusive, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung representatives concluded that enhanced 
political education of East Germans could stop the eroding legitimacy of West German core values of democracy 
and the market economy. “Es müsse die Legitimation von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft durch eine Schulung des 
Wertebewusstsein der ostdeutschen Bevölkerung gestärkt werden. Die Antworten der Wissenschaftler waren 
weniger eindeutig: Ob die Ostdeutschen die westdeutsche Institutionenordnung inzwischen weitgehend akzeptiert 
haben und sich die politischen und sozialen Einstellungen der Ost- und Westdeutschen einander annähern, ließ sich 
in ihren Augen nur schwer entscheiden.“ The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is a political foundation with education 
centers in Germany and more than 120 countries worldwide. Konrad Adenauer’s principles of peace, freedom, and 
justice are the foundation’s guidelines to promote the consolidation of democracy, the advancement of European 
conciliation, the intensification of transatlantic relations, and developmental cooperation. As a research institute and 
consulting agency, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung compiles scientific research and analyses as a basis for policy. 
The foundation’s academy in Berlin serves as a forum for future-oriented dialogue between representatives of 
politics, the economy, churches, society, and science. 
195 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 8. 
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never been virtues and competencies in over forty years of G.D.R. culture and socialist 
conditioning.196 West Germany’s endeavor to rapidly and comprehensively transfer its internal 
structure and regime into the East German states morphed the East German revolution into a top-
down and externally orchestrated transformation. East German society and individual East 
Germans became objects of transition instead of active executants and participants in change.197 
This approach prevented successful adaptation and integration. 
Similarly, Henri Vogt reasons that the swiftly executed unification through absorption 
lost many East Germans along the way. Having had no choice but to accept the West German 
takeover, “many felt that they had become pariahs in their own country, the country that they had 
been trying to build up as best they could for so many decades.”198 
Along those lines, Jens Bisky offered a more emblematic description of the East 
Germans’ dilemma, referring to Toralf Staud’s work on typical immigrant behavior patterns 
among East Germans. Excessive identification with, or exclusion from, the new culture, for 
instance, were frequently observed.199 Bisky implies that G.D.R. citizens eventually became 
immigrants without relocating. He concludes that such a conception of the German unification 
process is both accommodating and realistic.200 Bisky’s illustration of the East Germans 
becoming “immigrants without relocating” seems persuasive. However, David S. Yost’s work on 
political philosophy and international relations theory brings another analogy to mind. In his 
                                                 
196 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 145. “die für Politik und Leben in der DDR so typische Mischung aus 
Repression und paternalistischer Fürsorge war die denkbar schlechteste Vorbereitung auf das Leben unter 
Bedingungen schnellen Wandels, auf das Bestehen in Ungewißheit und Wettbewerb, auf die energische Nutzung der 
mit Risiken verbundenen neuen Chancen.”  
197 Ibid., 148. “Die Transformation hat zunächst die Gestalt einer ‘Revolution von außen und oben’ 
angenommen. Dies ließ die Ostdeutschen zu Objekten des Wandels werden, statt sie zu dessen aktiven Trägern zu 
machen.”  
198 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 118. 
199 Toralf Staud, “Ossis sind Türken,” Die Zeit Nr. 41 / 2003. October 2, 2003, 
http://www.zeit.de/2003/41/Einwanderer (accessed May 12, 2008). Staud, in his 2003 article “Ossis sind Türken” 
(East Germans are Turks; referring to West Germany’s large number of Turkish guest workers and immigrants), 
made a point by comparing East German manners and attitudes with typical immigrant behavior. He holds that most 
conflicts and irritations could be explained through the lens of a majority society’s expectations and a joining 
minority society’s preferences. In his view the conflict is between the host country demanding absolute assimilation 
and the immigrants’ willingness to merely integrate, and to preserve at least parts of their own identity. After 
reviewing examples from Russian Jews in Israel to United States citizens of Irish heritage, Staud concludes that 
West-East German tensions are typical conflicts between a host country and its immigrants.  
200 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 45.“Ungewöhnlich am Ostdeutschen Fall wäre sogesehen lediglich, dass die 
DDR-Bürger «eingewandert» sind, ohne den Ort zu wechseln. … Es gibt keine Vorstellung vom 
Vereinigungsprozess die so sympathisch und zugleich so realistisch wirkt.”  
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1994 analysis of the late British scholar Martin Wight’s published lectures, Yost focused on the 
“history of Western thought regarding international politics.”201 Though not within the context 
of German re-unification, Yost observed that due to the dominance of old “traditions of Realism” 
— traceable to Greek antiquity — Western thought, including that of the Rationalist tradition, 
“came to justify imperialism” and “colonization” as a paternalistic “right to rule others.”202 
Accordingly, a West German attitude — wittingly or unwittingly — of having a paternalistic 
right to set the tone throughout the German re-unification process appears intriguing and may be 
worthy of further investigation. 
It seems obvious that such alienation fails to create a cohesive, unified national identity. 
Ultimately, half a century “of independent statehood had created two distinct German identities, 
and it proved impossible to forget or reconstruct these in the course of a few months or years.”203 
Consequently, Vogt held the “central question” of “people’s identity” responsible for a spreading 
Ostalgie204 and explained how East Germans have had to come to terms with their past, rather 
than cauterizing part of themselves by negating what had been before. At the same time, 
however, such nostalgia for the old system — arguably to a certain degree an element of human 
coping — holds considerable long-term risks. Jens Bisky observed that a prevailing nostalgic 
undercurrent impedes East Germans from setting free their verve, and giving positive expression 
to their energy. Nostalgia has a paralyzing effect, and it embraces the negative virtue of self-
righteousness. Bisky called this “the calamitous inheritance of Chancellor Kohl’s unification 
policy.”205 
                                                 
201 David S. Yost, “Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations,” International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 70, no. 2 (April 1994), http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
5850%28199404%2970%3A2%3C263%3APPATTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S (accessed May 27, 2008), 263. David S. 
Yost’s article refers to: Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian 
Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).  
202 Yost, “Political Philosophy,” 283. 
203 Vogt, Between Utopia and Disillusionment, 119. 
204 GfdS, Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, Wiesbaden, http://www.gfds.de/index.php?id=11 (accessed May 
12, 2008). Ostalgie (Ost-Nostalgie / East-Nostalgia) is a colloquial neologism expressing growing East German 
nostalgia for the supposed delights and advantages of the German Democratic Republic’s political system. The word 
Ostalgie was placed 9th in the German 1993 Word of the Year contest.  
205 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 15-16.“Allerdings weckt die nostalgische Grundstimmung keine Kräfte, setzt 
kaum Energien frei. Vielmehr wirkt sie lähmend, und sie stärkt die Untugend der Selbstgerechtigkeit, das elende 
Erbe der Kohl’schen Vereinigungspolitik.”  
50 
 
With regard to social relations, political culture, and everyday life, Kocka noted, East 
German Westernization has met stern resistance and failed to spawn significant progress.206 He 
held that East Germany’s post-unification demographic breakdown is a most convincing 
indicator for economic and psychological corrosion and crisis.207 According to Kocka, a 60% 
decline in birth rates, combined with a 65% reduction in marriages and an 81% divorce rate 
increase among East Germans between 1989 and 1992, revealed their shattered trust and 
confidence, their inherent loss of orientation, and their generally widespread angst. A more 
cynical assessment noted that the 1994 East German record low in birth rates — on a worldwide  
scale — could be topped only by an even lower number of babies delivered in the Vatican.208 
Such significant birth rate declines are rare in history; comparable data could only be correlated 
to the two World Wars.209  
Kocka surmised that the limits of East Germany’s successful Westernization are currently 
marked by a reborn, specific, and adamantly defensive G.D.R. identity.210 He concluded that the 
present and future challenges of Germany’s “Unification Crisis” have become a test case for 
Germany’s parliamentary democracy and institutions, political parties and political culture, and 
political classes.211 His 1995 analysis seems to be holding true, and it was confirmed more than 
one decade later in the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006. According to this report, widespread 
disenchantment followed the initial East German unification euphoria. In 2006 only 9% of East 
                                                 
206 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 148. “Was jedoch die sozialen Beziehungen, die politische Kultur und das 
alltägliche Leben anbelangt, trifft der Transfer auf hartnäckigen Widerstand und hat bisher keine großen Fortschritte 
gemacht.”  
207 Ibid. “Auf anderen Ebenen – denen der Wirtschaft und der Psychologie – führte die rasche Übernahme des 
westdeutschen Systems zu Zerstörungen und Krisen, der demographische Zusammenbruch verdeutlicht dies.”  
208 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 38.“Eine Zahl charakterisiert die Atmosphäre ganz besonder: 23000 Babys 
wurden 1994 in den neuen Ländern geboren. Es war die niedrigste Geburtenrate der Welt, nur im Vatikan kamen 
noch weniger Kinder zur Welt.”  
209 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 145. “[Demographische] Rückgänge in dieser Größenordnung sind äußerst 
selten in der Geschichte. Nur die beiden Weltkriege verursachten bislang vergleichbare Einbrüche. … Es ist 
naheliegend, diesen demographischen Einbruch auf die durch die Vereinigung verursachte Krise zurückzuführen.”  
210 Ibid., 148. “Trotz großer westlicher Anstrengungen bei der Eingliederung des Ostens, scheint es, als ob eine 
eigene DDR-Identität wiederbelebt worden ist, die defensiv und hartnäckig die momentanen Grenzen der 
Verwestlichung des Ostens markiert.” 
211 Ibid., 149. “Die Vereinigungskrise wird zu einem Testfall für unsere parlamentarischen Institutionen, 
Parteien und politischen Klassen.”  
51 
 
Germany’s adult population was content with the current democratic developments, whereas 
33% were only partially satisfied, and 50% were discontented.212 
Simultaneously, the report underscored a dramatic loss of confidence and trust in societal 
and governmental institutions among East Germans. While 41% of East Germans were 
“entirely” or “highly confident” regarding the police, the city and municipal administrations 
(25%) and the law courts (24%) seemed to strike only about one quarter of all East Germans as 
trustworthy. The worst rated institutions, however, were the Bundestag (the parliament) and the 
Federal German Government, with only 5% and 7% of East German citizens “entirely” or 
“highly confident” regarding their trustworthiness.213 Accordingly, East German identification 
with and participation in the democratic structures and institutions of the Federal Republic of 
Germany is still weak. Kocka’s 1995 assertion that West German institutions have diffused into 
East Germany but have failed to take root, become ingrained, and substitute for traditional 
societal attachments and connections is supported by the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006.214 
An observation regarding such processes was provided by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Europe specialist, David S. Yost. In his 1994 article “Political Philosophy and the 
Theory of International Relations,” he observed that “Western traditions” in international 
relations “have shaped international institutions and general attitudes and policies, even (to some 
extent) in non-Western societies.” Yost concluded that “The legacy of Western dominance 
includes the main institutions of the states-system today, such as diplomatic practices and 
international law, the United Nations and other global organizations, and international 
commercial and financial procedures.” He reasoned that “further scholarly enquiry into the 
question of the universality of patterns of thinking about these institutions” was warranted and 
proposed the “hypothesis that many people in particular countries and/or culture-regions regard 
nominally universal institutions and values quite differently, owing in part to their distinct 
                                                 
212 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 22.“Der anfänglichen Euphorie ist Ernüchterung gefolgt. 2006 waren nur 
noch 9% der über 18-jährigen Ostdeutschen mit dem Stand der Demokratieentwicklung zufrieden, 33% waren 
teilweise zufrieden und 50% unzufrieden (7% ohne Antwort).”  
213 Ibid., 23. “Insgesamt ist das Vertrauen der Ostdeutschen in gesellschaftliche Institutionen eher gering. Am 
stärksten ausgeprägt ist es (2006) seitens der Ostdeutschen zur Polizei (41% voll/viel Vertrauen … ), zu den Stadt- 
bzw. Gemeindeverwaltungen (25%) sowie den Gerichten (24%). Bundestag (5%) und Bundesregierung (7%) 
genießen im geringsten Maße volles/viel Vertrauen und stehen bei den Bürgern nicht hoch im Kurs.”  
214 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 140 .“Westdeutsche Institutionen haben sich zwar in den Osten ausgebreitet, in 
der Bevölkerung konnten sie bislang aber kaum Wurzeln schlagen. Traditionelle Bindungen gingen verloren; ein 
Ersatz dafür konnte bisher noch nicht geschaffen werden.”  
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traditions.”215 Though Yost did not aim his findings specifically at the German re-unification 
case, the fundamental validity of his observations for this case can hardly be contested. 
At the same time, in his 1995 essay on the “Vereinigungskrise” (Unification Crisis), 
Jürgen Kocka concluded that more than forty years of different history had simply created two 
decisively different German societies in East and West and stood in the way of a swift socio-
cultural German unification.216 Five years after formal unification, Kocka ascribed an increasing 
East-West German alienation and a faltering inner unification to the decades of drifting apart, 
and to the different developmental paths of the two German societies.217 He described the 1990 
German unification as a West German absorption of the Eastern part of Germany and as an 
attempt to extend the successful West German system into the failed East German states. In 
1995, however, he observed that the limitations of this absorption and swift Westernization effort 
of East Germany’s fundamentally different society had become evident. Simultaneously, he 
identified the reemergence of old structures, ideologies and stereotypes which had amazingly 
survived the twentieth century’s cataclysms, only to haunt the unified German society once 
again. Kocka drew attention to the return of xenophobia, ethnic issues, nationalistically 
motivated tensions, and a variety of other old and familiar prejudices — and not only among the 
older East German population.218 The Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 supported Kocka’s 
conclusions and suggested that his 1995 analysis is today — more than a decade later — still 
relevant. Concurrently, the Volkssolidarität Sozialreport 2006 held the unbridled de-
industrialization of East Germany and the dissolution of its agricultural structures, combined 
with an insufficient and unsuccessful government-run labor-market policy — in the wake of 
unification and Westernization — responsible for marked and growing political extremism and 
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216 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 134. “… daß mehr als 40 Jahre unterschiedlicher, wenngleich aufeinander 
bezogener Geschichte aus einer zwei Gesellschaften gemacht hatten, deren Mitglieder sich wechselseitig stark 
unterschieden, so daß auch deshalb keine rasche Wiedervereinigung zu erwarten sei.”  
217 Ibid. “Die Entfremdung zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen hat in den letzten zwei Jahren wieder 
zugenommen. Das Stocken der inneren Vereinigung zeigt, wie weit man sich in vier Jahrzehnten eben doch 
auseinandergelebt hat.”  
218 Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, 136. “… gleichzeitig staunt man über die Überlebenskraft älterer Strukturen, die 
die Veränderungsenergien des 20. Jahrhunderts mit seinen Revolutionen und Katastrophen überstanden haben und 
nun wieder ans Tageslicht treten: zum Beispiel ethnische Identitäten, Nationalitätenkonflikte und geopolitische 




xenophobia among East Germans. Its analysis indicated that specific economic problems have 
contributed to East Germany’s negative social development.219 
Cocooning into a sphere of privacy, personal friendships and closely knit private relations 
seems to be a typical pattern of East German individual behavior that is opposed to the concept 
of participation in an open, democratic society and that eventually leaves civil society and its 
democratic structures weak. Latent and frequently manifest social tensions, national extremism, 
and radical right-wing hostilities in post-unification East Germany are commonly identified as 
destabilizing developments.220 At the same time, the World Bank’s “World Development Report 
1997” seemed to suggest that public rejection of institutions and citizens’ declining participation 
within civil society could weaken the effectiveness of public institutions and reduce the state’s 
capacity to ensure the security and welfare of the people.221 Simultaneously, the World Bank 
cautioned: “Marginalized from public discussion and excluded from the broader economy and 
society, such groups are fertile ground for violence and instability, as many parts of the world are 
increasingly learning.”222 Accordingly, the “Sozialreport 2006” found that 31% of East Germans 
at least partially supported the notion that a dictatorial government would be best to secure 
German interests, while 36% supported — if not fully, at least to a large extent — the view that 
Germany is entitled a superior place in the world community. The stance that too many foreign 
nationals live in Germany, and that their number should be reduced in the coming years, was 
endorsed — at least partially — by 74% of East German citizens.223 
                                                 
219 Winkler, “Sozialreport 2006,” 43. 
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D. CONCLUSION: HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HAS GERMAN SOCIO-
CULTURAL UNIFICATION BEEN ACHIEVED AND WHAT ARE ITS FUTURE 
PROSPECTS? 
It can be concluded from the evidence reviewed above that to this day inner unity and 
social cohesion have yet to be achieved in Germany. The rapid Westernization effort of the new 
German states was an attempt to create a successful and sustainable political and economic base 
for a liberal-democratic and prosperous unified Germany, based on the successful West German 
model. However, the endeavor to transform East Germany by cloning the West German system, 
some maintain, failed miserably and pulled the rug out from under German society. Owing to 
widespread frustrated enthusiasm, combined with economic marginalization and social 
disadvantages, many East Germans felt socially excluded. The resulting aversion to suspicious 
West German ways gave rise to a developing culture of defiance.224 Ensuing nostalgia, and 
naïvely lopsided adulation of the G.D.R. society’s benefits, positive norms and virtues, evolved 
as a basis for an avowal of East German exclusion and of not belonging. It brought forward a 
separate East German identity.225 Thus, two partial societies — a majority society of West 
Germans and a minority society of East Germans — evolved within one German state.226 
Meanwhile, staggering West-East German transfer payments have bolstered the social safety net, 
have mollified and sedated the East German minority society, and — on the surface — have 
established peace and quiet on a shaky foundation.227 
Simultaneously, other views emphasize the political and economic achievements since 
1989 and argue that a process of social cohesion will soon follow to develop common ground 
between East and West Germans. A January 2006 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach poll is just 
one example of the basis for such optimism. According to this poll, for the first time since 
German unification, more than half of all East German interviewees (54%) stated they identified 
                                                 
224 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 36.“Das war eines von vielen Zeichen für die Entwicklung einer Trotzkultur. 
Man hatte eine Revolution angezettelt und ein anderes System gewollt. Nun schienen die Herren aus dem Westen 
den Osten zu überrollen.”  
225 Ibid., 10.“Nach der Wende hat sich eine eigene ostdeutsche Identität herausgebildet, ein deutliches 
Bekenntnis, nicht dazuzugehören.”  
226 Ibid. “Fünfzehn Jahre nach der Wiedervereinigung existieren zwei Teilgesellschaften in einem Staat.” 
227 Bisky, Die deutsche Frage, 22-23.“… die Gesellschaft ist nach wie vor schwach, viele leben in prekären 
Verhältnissen. Die Transferleistungen haben hier für Ruhe und Ordnung gesorgt. Aber der Grund blieb schwankend, 
Soziales, Politik und Wirtschaft ohne halt.”  
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themselves primarily as Germans, rather than as East Germans.228 While this is at first sight a 
seemingly significant development, these figures also imply that 46% still do not identify 
themselves primarily as simply Germans, but continue to identify themselves as East Germans. 
The analogy of a half-full or a half-empty glass comes to mind and leaves the observer bemused, 
without a clear-cut, black and white, easily quantifiable picture. 
However, for the purpose at hand, such a distinctively quantifiable picture is not 
necessarily imperative. The evidence presented above underscores a significant qualitative 
disparity in culture between the two divergent societies in East and West Germany: pre- and 
post-unification. It also strongly suggests that such variance has been effected by the decades-
long political, ideological, and cultural conditioning of the respective societies. 
The supposition that the abiding socio-cultural cleavages between East and West 
Germans will only eventually be surmounted in society’s collective consciousness, to be 
replaced with a cohesive and unified German identity, seems not at all far-fetched.229 
At the same time, the persisting socio-cultural tensions between East and West Germans, 
nearly two decades and an estimated 1.5 trillion Euro after German unification, underscore 
individual and societal receptiveness to, and the potency and the resilience of, ideology, 
emotional bonding, and societal conditioning. 
                                                 
228 Elisabeth Noelle und Thomas Petersen, “Deutsche Einheit: Ost und West bewegen sich aufeinander zu,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Nr. 21 / Seite 5. Frankfurt 25 January 2006. 
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E46B42F0CD8E64B7CA3161AB63FED
E15C~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (accessed May 12, 2008). “In diesem Jahr sagen nun zum ersten Mal 54 
Prozent der Ostdeutschen, also die deutliche Mehrheit, sie fühlen sich in erster Linie als Deutsche.” Prof. Dr. h.c. 
Elisabeth Noelle is benefactress, and has been on the executive board of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 
Gesellschaft zum Studium der öffentlichen Meinung mbH (IfD) since 1947. 
229 Noelle und Petersen, “Deutsche Einheit.” Elisabeth Noelle und Thomas Petersen observed in 2006 that 
traumatic events and experiences can characterize a nation and stay in its collective memory for centuries. It is 
argued that a nursery rhyme – commonly known throughout German regions  – can be traced back more than 350 
years, to the Thirty Years’ War, when Swedish troops ravaged and looted the German states („Maikäfer, flieg'! Der 
Vater ist im Krieg. Die Mutter ist in Pommerland, Pommerland ist abgebrannt. Maikäfer flieg.“ – Fly May bug, Fly! 
Father is at war. Mother is in Pomerania, Pomerania has been scorched. Fly May bug, Fly). The woeful nursery 
rhyme has survived German division and remains part of unified Germany’s collective culture and identity to this 
day. It echoes the society’s traumatic experiences during the Thirty Years’ War, which annihilated two thirds of the 
population in some regions. The article raises the question of how long more than forty years of division will 
probably reverberate in Germany’s collective memory.  
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IV. THE RELEVANCE OF GERMANY’S RE-UNIFICATION 
EXPERIENCE FOR THE TWO KOREAS 
The earlier examination of the German unification case indicated that political and 
economic harmonization between West and East Germany had a high priority in the wake of 
unification. Economic stabilization, and consolidation of the political system in the acceding East 
German regions, would be the imperative foundation for a stable and unified Germany, able to 
fulfill its obligations within the European and transatlantic framework. Initial grievances, owing 
to personal disappointments during the process of transforming an inefficient socialist command 
economy into a modern, globally interdependent, and efficient market economy, were expected 
and could be coped with. West Germany’s posture, as one of the strongest European economies 
and a consolidated institutional democracy, would allow for sufficient resources, a strong 
political will, and widespread popular support to achieve a swift and effective Aufbau Ost.230 
However, the German buzzwords Vereinigungskrise (Unification Crisis) and Mauer in den 
Köpfen (Wall Inside The Minds) refer to an aspect of German unification which is connected to, 
but lies beyond, the mere material plane of economics and politics. Socio-cultural disparities 
between many East and West Germans, based on ideologies, emotional ties, and societal 
conditioning, proved to be robust long-term factors for constricted individual and group 
interrelations. Such conflicts — mostly subdued to subliminal perception — would typically take 
on greater significance with the rising disillusionment, economic marginalization, and social 
exclusion of many East Germans. 
Accordingly, the following section reviews the prospective parallels between the German 
and the Korean cases and assesses shared socio-cultural drivers affecting an eventual unification 
of the Korean societies. While an extensive body of data, literature, and research pre- and post-
unification is available on the German case, the situation for the D.P.R.K. is entirely different. 
Due to the secretive and reclusive nature of the totalitarian North Korean regime, its official data 
is scarce; statements from international institutions and non-governmental institutions are seldom 
primary sources and rely on deductions or estimates. Pyongyang’s officially sanctioned 
                                                 
230 The term Aufbau Ost (Rebuilding in the East) refers to the institutional and economic reconstruction which 
followed German re-unification. The aim was to bring living conditions in both East and West Germany closer 
together. As almost the entire East German industry was outdated, enormous efforts were called for to modernize it. 
In order to fund the rebuilding and development of the former East Germany the Solidaritätszuschlag (solidarity tax) 
was implemented in July 1991(an additional income tax, initially 7.5%, since 1998 reduced to 5.5%). 
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information is usually subject to propaganda and not beyond doubt. Moreover, publications on 
“internal dynamics of this society, let alone with its daily life, are few and far between.”231 
While such circumstances prohibit a solid quantitative analysis, a range of publications is 
available to capture the qualitative aspects of ideology, emotions, and interaction within North 
Korean society. To this purpose, accounts from North Korean refugees and defectors232 and 
reports from foreign nationals who lived in North Korea,233 in addition to Korean press releases, 
are utilized in the following section to paint a picture of North Korea’s socio-cultural milieu. 
A. THE BASIS OF NORTH KOREA’S SOCIETAL ORGANIZATION 
Elementary topics within the existing body of literature on North Korea include the Kim 
dynasty’s personality cult and its penetration of daily life in North Korea. Former labor camp 
inmate and later defector Chol-hwan Kang, for example, describes the personality cult and its 
high degree of emotional bonding when recalling his childhood memories as follows: 
Kim Il-sung was actually even better than Father Christmas, because he seemed 
so eternally young and omniscient. Like his son, Kim Jong-il, who was said to be 
in line to succeed him, he was more like a god to us than Father Christmas. The 
newspapers, the radio, posters, our textbooks, our teachers: everyone and 
everything seemed to confirm this.234  
Chol-hwan Kang concluded that Kim Il-sung “was the object of a personality cult extravagant 
enough to rival that of Stalin or Mao Tse-tung, and indeed, even to outlive them. In 1998, the 
People’s Supreme Assembly even made the astounding decision to name Kim Il-sung president 
‘for all eternity’ — four years after his death!”235 At the same time, Michael Harrold, a longtime 
                                                 
231 Lankov, North of the DMZ, 331. 
232 Kang and Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang. Chol-hwan Kang, a former prisoner in a North Korean 
penal camp, defected to South Korea. His account describes life in North Korea from a Japanese-Korean immigrant 
family’s view. Hunter, Kim Il-Song's North Korea. Additionally, Helen-Louise Hunter published her declassified 
version of a CIA sociological study of everyday life in North Korea in 1999. Due to the classified nature of Hunter’s 
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233 Michael Harrold, Comrades and Strangers Behind the Closed Doors of North Korea (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2004). From 1987 to 1994, Michael Harrold lived and worked in North Korea as an editor for the 
Pyongyang regime’s Foreign Languages Publishing House. His account of daily life in North Korea, from a young 
British citizen’s perspective, draws a sympathetic picture of “the world’s most closed society.”  
234 Kang and Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang, 2. 
235 Ibid., 3. 
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Pyongyang resident employed by the government-run Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
revealed the extent of commonly accepted state intrusion: 
North Koreans are urged, even obliged, to turn to the great leader [Kim Il-sung] in 
all they do. Regular weekly study sessions are held at which the people learn by 
heart sections of the works of the great leader, on topics ranging from such 
general matters as public security and what is considered proper behavior in the 
street and at work, to guidance in their professional and political activities, to 
intimate personal hygiene hints on brushing their teeth and washing their feet.236 
Helen-Louise Hunter based her work on an extensive, now declassified, CIA sociological 
study of everyday life in the D.P.R.K. She specifically identifies and addresses two distinctive 
attributes which classify North Korean individuals and form “The Twin Pillars of Society.”237 In 
her view, songbun (“class background”) and Kim-Il-song sangsa (“The thought of Kim Il-song”) 
are the two basic concepts defining North Korean society. They are the basis to understanding 
North Korean individuals, groups, relationships, social status, decision-making, and reasoning. In 
short, songbun and Kim-Il-song sangsa entirely delineate individual, public, and political life in 
North Korea.238  
B. NORTH KOREAN CLASS BACKGROUND AND LOYALTY TO THE KIM 
CULT 
A person’s songbun defines his position within North Korean society, according to his 
family’s class background. Descendants of combatants in the anti-Japanese struggle and families 
of Korean War veterans, followed by individuals with a working class or peasant heritage, enjoy 
the highest status of trustworthiness and are eligible for higher education and professional and 
societal advancement. According to Hunter, this group comprises 25 to 30 percent of the North 
Korean population. “Ranked below them in descending order are forty-seven distinct groups in 
what must be the most class-differentiated society in the world today.” Of these remaining, 
roughly 40 percent are average citizens, without a significantly positive or negative birthright, 
who “hope for a lucky break, such as a good assignment in the military that will bring them to 
the attention of party cadres and get them a better job.” The remaining 30 percent of the 
population — descendants of the pre-Communist elite or dissidents — are treated as the society’s 
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residuum. They constitute a pariah class, without any hopes beyond a mediocre education. For 
them, the future holds an existence in lowly manual labor, often in secluded and rural areas. 
They cannot have any reasonable hope for advancement in the professional and social hierarchy 
for themselves or their children.239 In order to verify and continuously update the individual 
songbun ranking, North Korea’s security apparatus “conduct[s] repeated investigations to the 
point where everyone has been investigated and reinvestigated, and investigated yet again.”240 
The outcome of such a coercive domestic organization is, as Bruce Cumings put it, “twenty-two 
million citizens each with a personal reliability rating.”241 
According to Helen-Louise Hunter, the second “key element” to personal advancement in 
North Korea, apart from one’s songbun, is “loyalty to Kim,” as expressed in one’s Kim-Il-song 
sangsa.242 While songbun — as the concept of class struggle within the framework of Socialist 
ideology — seems plausible and easily comprehensible, Kim-Il-song sangsa, as the thought of 
Kim Il-sung, appears to be a more complex and more elusive construct to understand. Instead of 
delving into the details of Juche — the North Korean state ideology — for an explanation, 
Helen-Louise Hunter simply characterizes North Korea as a “cult society:” “North Korean 
society is very much like a cult society, organized around the cult of Kim Il-song [sic].”243 She 
utilizes a variety of examples to convey her notion of the Kim cult and to lend credibility to her 
convincing assessment that “the Kim cult may prove to be one of the most remarkable cults of all 
time.”244 The level of Kim veneration seems to amount to deification.  It is an efficient mix of 
emotional bonding and deep ideological indoctrination, and “its hold over the perception and 
thought patterns of North Koreans is awe-inspiring.”245 As noted in Chapter II, such an 
assessment can merely attempt to illustrate the effects of Juche on North Korean society. The 
deep cultivation of the Kim dynasty’s teachings in a community whose forms of dependency, 
communications, and interactions are invariably oriented along Juche fundamentalism is 
intended to achieve complete control over this “society of believers.” The resulting domestic 
focus and virtual exclusion from external influences are designed to produce a highly marked 
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level of isolation and ignorance which, due to its elusiveness, foreigners and the uninitiated 
frequently characterize as irrational behavior. Consequently, Hunter does not shy from 
comparing the North Korean people’s loyalty and obedience to the Kim cult, which extend “to 
preposterous lengths at times,”246 to Jim Jones’s or Charles Manson’s cultic communes.247 At 
the same time, ideology-based reciprocities within society develop their peculiar norms and 
conventions within the framework of the common belief system. In order to receive a higher 
education, pursue a career of choice, and advance in societal and professional status in North 
Korea, a particularly fervent display of Kim-Il-song sangsa is required. Since competition within 
the system is entirely based on political reliability and loyalty, the magnitude of one’s display of 
enthusiasm towards Kim-Il-song sangsa matters more than individual merit and professional 
performance. Indeed, an individual’s merit and professional performance derive from, and are 
based on, memorized teachings, quotations, and insights of the Great Leader or the Dear Leader, 
rather than from true achievements in everyday life. Helen-Louise Hunter concludes that “one’s 
advancement will be determined much more by one’s display of devotion to Kim’s teachings 
than by one’s technical or administrative or substantial skills.”248 This suggests that the society’s 
officially sanctioned value system has been significantly reoriented during the Kim dynasty, 
from a traditional materialistic outlook, into a naïvely spiritualized and quixotic construct based 
on the superficial but fervent display of personal passion for the state ideology. 
North Korea’s songbun and Kim-Il-song sangsa, a combination of aggressive class-based 
segregation and an all-embracing cultic ideology, seem to represent the two main characteristics 
of the society’s frame of reference. Consequently, both class discrimination and political 
ideology will have to be compared to determine the relevance of the German unification 
experience for Korea. 
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C. “REALEXITSIERENDER SOZIALISMUS” IN THE G.D.R.: CLASS 
BACKGROUND, POLITICAL RELIABILITY, LOYALTY TO THE SED PARTY 
Contrary to official propaganda, quite distinct class differences could be found in the 
G.D.R. Martin Diewald’s and Heike Solga’s analysis of “life experiences” (Lebensverläufe) in 
the G.D.R. found that it would be difficult to validate the notion of a socialistically egalitarian 
G.D.R. society. Diewald’s and Solga’s work concludes that the G.D.R. society’s functional 
differentiation brought about noticeable differences in living conditions.249 A similar conclusion 
results from a 2004 study on human body height in relation to social class. The report, published 
by the Bavarian state government, attributed more pronounced body growth to upper class 
G.D.R. citizens than to those from lower class provenance. As a result, John Komlos und 
Marieluise Baur concluded that the officially classless G.D.R. apparently failed to achieve its 
declared objective of an egalitarian society since the difference in body height between upper 
class and lower class affiliates amounted to 2.5 cm (0.98 in) for males and 3.2 cm (1.26 in) for 
females.250 
Particular examples of class distinctions in the G.D.R. were frequently found in the realm 
of education. Higher education, for example, was only made available to faithful supporters of 
the political system who had demonstrated Linientreue — political reliability and loyalty to the 
system.251 The 1958 “Decree on the Socialist Reconfiguration of Higher Education in the GDR” 
enshrined this principle in G.D.R. legislation.252 The edict stated explicitly that it was the 
                                                 
249 Martin Diewald and Heike Solga, “Soziale Ungleichheiten in der DDR: Die feinen, aber deutlichen 
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251 The term Linientreue (being true to party principles) is party jargon for an individual’s personal attachment 
to the party’s statutes, manifestoes, and resolutions. Typically a citizen’s loyalty to the G.D.R.’s SED party was 
based on his correct class awareness or class attitude (Klassenbewusstsein / Klassenstandpunkt). According to 
Lenin, such trueness to party principles would be passed on to the individual citizen through the party’s subordinate 
mass organizations, as "Transmissionsriemen der Parteiarbeit" (transmission belts of party work). 
252 DDR Schulrecht, “Verordnung über die weitere sozialistische Umgestaltung des Hoch- und 
Fachschulwesens in der DDR vom 13. Februar 1958 (GBl. I Nr. 15 S. 175),” http://www.ddr-
schulrecht.de/Schulrechtssammlung%20-%20DDR-Dateien/pdf/1958-b.pdf (accessed May 14, 2008). 
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mission of the G.D.R.’s higher educational institutions to cultivate scientifically and technically 
trained academic professionals who were devoted to the workers’ and peasants’ state. These 
capable and willing individuals were to utilize science and technology for the advancement and 
development of the G.D.R. socialist state.253 It was further decreed that selection for admission 
to higher education should favor able peasant and working-class children or children from 
military families who were faithfully devoted to the workers’ and peasants’ state.254 
Accordingly, Jürgen Engert, today a popular German TV journalist and political commentator, 
was denied university enrollment in the G.D.R. due to his bourgeois class background.255 
In fact, discrimination according to class background and/or political reliability and 
loyalty was sanctioned by the G.D.R.’s existing administrative laws and regulations. According 
to Article 10 of the G.D.R.’s Bewerbungsordnung (application regulation), employers were 
obliged to seek approbation from the local unionist cadre and from the resident youth 
organization leadership before accepting any job applicants.256 While on the surface this 
regulation was meant to promote participation and egalitarianism, such a rule in fact served to 
ensure that two reliable institutions vouched for the applicant’s proper class background and for 
his political reliability, or Linientreue. 
Additionally, in his examination of the G.D.R.’s industrial working environment, 
Wolfgang Zimmermann found that career paths were determined by Socialist manpower 
planning and control, rather than by personal choice. From an official G.D.R. viewpoint, good 
career choices were put into practice when, to the greatest possible extent, agreement between 
corporate requirements and individual career interests and affinities could be achieved. Needless 
                                                 
253 DDR Schulrecht. “Verordnung über die weitere sozialistische.” “Die Universitäten, Hoch- und Fachschulen 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik haben die Aufgabe, in genügender Zahl wissenschaftliche und technische 
Fachkräfte heranzubilden, die der Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht treu ergeben sind und die Fähigkeit besitzen, 
Wissenschaft und Technik dem sozialistischen Aufbau dienbar zu machen.”  
254 Ibid., I. 2. n. “Das Staatssekretariat für das Hoch- und Fachhochschulwesen hat folgende Aufgaben: … n) 
bei der Zulassung zum Studium zu erreichen, daß der Anteil befähigter Arbeiter- und Bauernkinder, bewährte Kräfte 
aus der sozialistischen Produktion, der Nationalen Volksarmee und anderen bewaffneten Organen sowie aus 
Kreisen, die der Arbeiter- und Bauern-Macht treu ergeben sind verstärkt wird.” ” 
255 Orton Huber, „Magister auf Umwegen: Weil er in der DDR nicht studieren durfte, ging Jürgen Engert in 
den Westen,“ Freie Universität Berlin, Kommunikations- und Informationsstelle. November 18, 2006, 
http://www.fu-berlin.de/presse/publikationen/tsp/2006/ts_20061118/ts_20061118_09.html (accessed May 14, 2008). 
256 “Anordnung über die Bewerbung um eine Lehrstelle – Bewerbungsordnung 1982,” Bewerbungsordung §10 
(2). Bearbeitung der Bewerbungen, http://www.drkoerner.net/DDverordn/bbbewerbord.htm (accessed May 14, 
2008). “Der Leiter des Betriebes gewährleistet, daß die zuständige betriebliche Gewerkschaftsleitung und die 
Leitung der FDJ-Grundorganisation des Betriebes an der Entscheidung über die Bewerbung teilnehmen können.”  
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to say, personal preferences and desires would have to yield to the overall benefit of the Socialist 
system. While the G.D.R. bureaucracy’s administrative euphemism was Einsicht in die 
Notwendigkeit (understanding for the necessity), Wolfgang Zimmermann concluded that strong 
constraints on the individual citizens’ career and job choices could be substantiated in the 
G.D.R.’s Socialist system.257 Gitta Scheller’s 2005 analysis came to a similar conclusion. She 
explained how, starting in the sixth grade, students would receive career counseling and 
guidance with the aim of matching individual preferences and abilities to the economy’s 
requirements. According to one 23-year-old interviewee, one would simply be steered — 
socialistically — towards the “right” choice. In short, Gitta Scheller’s analysis supported the 
view that in reality there was never actual freedom to choose a career, an education, or a job in 
the G.D.R.258 
Similar examples were manifold and affected all aspects and all levels of daily life in the 
G.D.R. Housing, education, profession and career — and access to consumer goods, luxury 
goods and privileges — were strictly allocated according to proper class background and 
political reliability. The proper functioning of such an allocation system was to be ensured by the 
G.D.R.’s government institutions, in cooperation with the party’s subordinate mass 
organizations. For an added measure of control, these institutions and mass organizations were 
                                                 
257 Wolfgang Zimmermann, “Die industrielle Arbeitswelt der DDR unter dem Primat der sozialistischen 
Ideologie,” Teilband 1. Band VIII, LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 2002, 508. “Sozialistische 
Arbeitskräfteplanung und –lenkung waren bekanntermaßen auf die Beeinflussung der Berufswahl und verbindliche 
Regelungen für die Betriebe verwiesen und steuerten damit den Berufsnachwuchs in die Mehrschichtarbeit. Die 
Berufswahl … war dann aus parteibestimmter Sicht ‘richtig’, wenn zwischen den gesellschaftlichen Erfordernissen 
und den individuellen Berufsinteressen und –neigungen weitgehende Übereinstimmung bestand. … Die starke 
Einschränkung von Berufswahl und Wahl des Arbeitsplatzes, die sich im deutschen sozialistischen System 
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258 Gitta Scheller, “Die Wende als Individualisierungsschub: Umfang, Richtung und Verlauf des 
Individualisierungsprozesses in Ostdeutschland,” VS Verlag Wiesbaden, 2005, 71. “Um eine Kompatibilität 
zwischen Ausbildungs- und Berufsbereich zu gewährleisten, wurde i.d.R. bereits ab der 6. Klasse eine 
Berufsberatung und –lenkung durchgeführt, die von dem Ziel getragen war, Wünsche und Fähigkeiten der 
Heranwachsenden mit den Erfordernissen der Wirtschaft in Einklang zu bringen. Von einer freien Berufswahl, einer 
freien Wahl der Ausbildungsstätte und des Arbeitsplatzes kann also für die DDR nicht die Rede sein. … ‘Man 
wurde da’ – so eine 23-jährige Bewohnerin in Gotha, ‘sozialistisch hingelenkt’.”  
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penetrated and monitored by the Staatssicherheit to a remarkably high level.259 Official agents 
and informal associates (Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter — IM) from among the population — pressed, 
blackmailed, or lured with prospective privileges into collaboration with the Staatssicherheit — 
would report on colleagues, friends, and even on members of their own family. 
The Pyongyang regime commands a similarly coercive and aggressively intrusive 
security apparatus which has been equally involved in, and utilized for, “armed invasion, border 
violations, infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies, hijacking, kidnapping, terrorism (including 
assassination and bombing), threat/intimidation against political leaders and media personnel and 
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argued, they had been obliged to follow official orders to cooperate with and support the West German RAF 
terrorists. For a R.A.F. chronology of events from 1968 until 1999 see „Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) Chronologie,“ 
LANDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ Baden-Württemberg, 2008, http://www.verfassungsschutz-
bw.de/links/links_terrorismus_raf_chrono_druck.htm (accessed May 14, 2008). For further information regarding 
the cited legal details see: „Bundesgerichtshof spricht ehemalige Angehörige des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit 
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(accessed May 14, 2008)  
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institutions, and incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government.”260 
Additionally, according to the U.S. government’s 2006 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” the 
D.P.R.K. harbored four Japanese Red Army members who were involved in an airplane 
hijacking in 1970.”261 
At the same time, however, G.D.R. leaders were never the subject of cultic adoration or 
worship. Although Soviet veneration of Lenin and Stalin had been emulated to a certain extent in 
the G.D.R. until the mid-1950s, it seems safe to say that the G.D.R. leadership’s authority and 
legitimacy never rested on individual charismatic leaders or their public enshrinement through a 
cultic organization. Apart from the G.D.R. leaders’ traditionally non-charismatic apparatchik 
personalities, they certainly enjoyed deference and commanded public respect. Besides, after the 
Nazi experience, the post-World War II re-creation of a leadership cult would have probably not 
been a politically opportune choice. Instead, the G.D.R. leadership focused all authority and 
underlying legitimacy on the SED party, its institutions and the subordinate mass organizations. 
In conclusion, the class distinctions and the importance of political reliability and loyalty 
in the G.D.R. show some significant parallels to the North Korean case. While North Korea’s 
dynastic Kim cult was unmatched in the G.D.R., it can be deduced that class background and 
political reliability were significant elements of societal organization — though to a lesser degree 
— in the G.D.R. As in today’s North Korea, G.D.R. society was far from being liberal and  
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egalitarian. Similarly, an individual’s social and professional advancement and prospects in life 
were based on class background, Klassenbewusstsein, and on Linientreue,262 as the measures of 









                                                 
262 Klassenbewusstsein means class awareness or class attitude, while Linientreue stands for being true to party 
principles. For a detailed discussion of the terms Klassenbewusstsein and Linientreue, see note 248. 
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V. JUCHE: IDEOLOGICAL BARRIER BETWEEN THE SOCIETIES 
ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE 38TH PARALLEL OR POTENTIAL 
COMMON GROUND FOR PROSPECTIVE KOREAN NATIONAL RE-
UNIFICATION? 
The final chapter of this thesis examines whether North Korean Juche Fundamentalism is 
likely to create an even higher “Wall Inside The Minds” and lead to a significantly more potent 
“Unification Crisis” within an eventually unified Korean society than has been observed in the 
German case since 1989-1990. The essential question pursued is whether Juche constitutes an 
insurmountable ideological barrier between the societies on the two sides of the 38th parallel or 
whether it could rather offer common grounds for North and South Koreans and thereby 
facilitate prospective socio-cultural re-unification. 
Initially, an assessment of Juche’s future staying power is conducted. In light of 
Pyongyang’s obviously growing dependence on foreign aid, continued economic decline, and 
probably inevitable resulting social unrest, we might soon witness what Andrei Lankov has 
called “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism.”263 At the same time, it could be argued, 
the Pyongyang theocracy and its fundamentalist religious ideology of Juche have weathered 
various arduous external and domestic challenges for decades, and have frustrated many 
contemporary augurs and their prophecies of collapse. 
The second section examines Juche’s potential appeal to South Korean society. At first 
sight, North Korea’s socialist-inspired Juche fundamentalism appears to offer little that might be 
attractive to a secularly organized South Korean capitalist democracy. Upon closer inspection, 
however, elements of Juche might well connect with a shared North-South Korean national 
identity. Such nationalism seems rooted in a shared historical, cultural, and religious narrative, 
intensified by the common trauma of a colonial heritage, the Korean War, and the ensuing 
struggles within the respective political systems north and south of the 38th parallel. 
Finally, a concluding section consolidates the main findings of this thesis and assesses 
whether Juche’s characteristics of a “Religion in Transition”264 could qualify as a pathway for 
                                                 
263 Lankov, “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism,” 95-121. 
264 Thomas J. Belke, Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion (Bartlesville, OK: Living 
Sacrifice Book Company, 1999), 341. 
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eventual socio-cultural Korean re-unification, rather than constituting a persistent ideological 
barrier between the two Korean societies. The final conclusion is that currently North Korea’s 
Juche constitutes an ideological barrier between the two Korean societies. However, at the same 
time, Juche holds various cultural, historical and religious aspects which could appeal to both 
Korean societies and which could offer a prospective vehicle for societal re-unification. Juche’s 
traditional Confucian hierarchical structure, its response to deeply-rooted national and ethnic 
Korean sentiments, and even its living god and his evolving scriptures and teachings, might offer 
reasonable opportunities for Juche’s future transformation and adjustment to a new reality on a 
re-unified Korean peninsula. 
A. JUCHE’S STAYING POWER — IMMINENT INTERMENT OR TRIUMPHAL 
PROCESSION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
According to a 2006 assessment by North Korea expert Andrei Lankov, “The [North 
Korean] Stalinist system is drifting toward collapse and oblivion. This is a welcome 
development, and should be encouraged.”265 He acknowledged that “North Korea remains under 
authoritarian rule.”266 However, as a result of the 1990s famine267 and North Korean “coping 
strategies,”268 Lankov identified “dramatic social changes that have taken place in North Korea 
over the last fifteen years.”269 He reasoned that the allegedly visible decline of Pyongyang’s 
“information management system… [and] the growth of the market economy,” and the eventual 
“collapse of the elaborate social control system that had defined the lives of the North Koreans 
since World War II” would herald the regime’s collapse.270 He set forth an optimistic 
assessment: “Whereas the Chinese government implemented reforms and steered the society in a 
direction that leaders considered favorable, in North Korea society took that road itself, dragging 
a rather reluctant state behind.”271 Lankov concluded by recommending engagement with North 
Korea through “economic exchanges” as “small investments toward larger-scale change in the 
                                                 
265 Lankov, “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism,” 121. 
266 Ibid., 96. 
267 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 408. 
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268 Lankov, “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism,” 113. 
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future”272 that would promote the “ongoing transformation of North Korean society.”273 In short, 
he conveyed the impression that the 1990s famine had finally weakened the hermit kingdom 
sufficiently to leave Pyongyang with no alternative but to agree to “cooperative engagement.”274 
Such a development would, he argued, eventually undermine and collapse the Kim dynasty’s 
regime. 
That optimism, however, turned out to be in stark contrast to the 2007 Amnesty 
International Annual Report on North Korea: 
Opposition of any kind was not tolerated. Any person who expressed an opinion 
contrary to the position of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party reportedly faced 
severe punishment and so did their families in many cases… In October [2006], 
the NGO Reporters Sans Frontieres listed North Korea as the worst violator of 
press freedom… People involved in public and private religious activities faced 
imprisonment, torture and execution.275 
A similar message was conveyed by the March 2008 report of fifteen North Koreans 
being executed publicly for illegally crossing into China in pursuit of food. According to the 
BBC, a North Korean official stated, “We shot them to send a warning to people over this.”276 
Likewise, a November 2007 Fox News headline read, “A North Korean factory chief accused of 
making international phone calls was executed by a firing squad in a stadium before 150,000 
spectators, a South Korean aid group reported.”277 Although the global community by now has 
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become familiar with similar public spectacles in Fundamentalist regimes like Iran,278 
Afghanistan,279 and Nigeria,280 such examples hardly support Andrei Lankov’s 2006 vision of a 
weakening and consequently liberalizing regime in a North Korea ripe for collapse. 
Accordingly, Lankov’s 2008 assessment of the domestic impact of the 1990s famine on 
the Kim dynasty’s regime was more guarded: “All domestic groups whose discontent could have 
dangerous effects (i.e., the army, police, and populaces of major cities) were kept alive and 
relatively content through the combination of aid distribution, police terror, and information 
control.”281 
In contrast to Andrei Lankov’s traditional economy-focused examination of North 
Korea’s prospects, Thomas J. Belke puts emphasis on Juche and its “spiritual dimension” to 
explore prospective future outcomes and the regime’s perseverance.282 While Lankov’s 
economic perspective observed signs of opening, reform and a general relaxation of the regime’s 
iron grip in the wake of the 1990s famine, Belke drew the opposite conclusion from his 
religiously-focused perspective in 1999. 
Belke credited Juche, which he called “A Religion in Transition,” as a means to stabilize 
Kim Jong-il’s regime and his control over North Korea’s society. According to his assessment, 
“With the 1990s have come new Juche teachings about ‘Red Flag ideology,’ the smooth 
accession of Kim Jong Il to deity upon the death of Kim Il Sung, and an increasing emphasis on 
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exporting Juche abroad.”283 He further noted, as previously discussed in Chapter II, that 
Pyongyang’s 1997 institution of the Juche Era calendar “resets the clock of mankind to 
synchronize the year zero with the year of Kim Il Sung’s birth — 1912.” This, in Belke’s view, 
is an “important example of the progressive development of the Juche cult religion.”284 Belke 
also noticed a shift in the official propaganda’s terminology. While the term “Great Leader” had 
previously been dedicated solely to Kim Il-sung, in 1997 the official vocabulary started 
denominating the “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il as “another great leader.”285 By September 2000, 
moreover, official propaganda proclaimed, “The Korean nation has now held in high esteem the 
great leader Kim Jong Il who is identical with him [Kim Il-sung] in idea, leadership and 
virtues.”286 Within three years, the initially almost imperceptible shift had obviously been 
consolidated, and Kim Jong-il’s succession had been solidified. Belke concludes that today, 
“under the Juche religious system, Kim Jong Il is considered to be just as much ‘god’ as his 
father.”287 
Belke holds that, “linked to the new Juche Era concept,” is Kim Jong-il’s proclaimed 
“Red Flag Ideology.”288 The South Korean internet newspaper The Daily NK supports Belke’s 
assessment:289 
The political section of this year's [2001] New Year Address (published in the 
form of a public editorial) propagandized the 'Red Flag ideology' and 'military-
first politics,' the two ideological pillars of Kim Jong Il's government, explaining 
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that ‘the foundation for implementing the Red Flag party line lies in strengthening 
military-first politics.’ The 'Red Flag ideology' is simply a ruling ideology for the 
purpose of controlling the people, camouflaged by the slogans 'Faith in the victory 
of Socialism' and 'Protect and uphold the Great Leader.' But the military-first 
politics is a distinct characteristic of the Kim Jong Il regime that deserves more 
attention and analysis… The media explains that military-first politics is, as its 
name indicates, ‘stressing the importance of the military and putting top priority 
on strengthening the military.’ Unlike superficial political styles meant to 
exaggerate Kim Jong Il's greatness or benevolence – such as 'magnanimous 
politics' or 'benevolent politics' – military-first politics seems to be a distinct 
method of political rule that is manifested in actual government policies.290 
In contrast to other cases, where Communist campaigns were launched to pursue 
ambitious revolutionary aims, but turned into nothing but counterproductive smoke and mirrors 
(e.g., the Great Leap Forward), Juche’s religious-ideological potency so far may have proved to 
outdo mere propaganda and ideology.291 Accordingly, to stress the importance of Kim Jong-il’s 
newly adapted ideologies, Belke made the point that “under the Juche system, a new ‘ideology’ 
is by definition a new divinely inspired religious doctrine.”292 He concluded in 1999 that “Kim 
Jong Il’s recent introduction of ‘Red Flag Ideology’ represents the introduction of a new super-
zealot face of Juche for the ‘Juche Era’ of the 21st century. This radical shift may be intended to 
counter what Kim Jong Il perceives as the threat of growing outside influence on North 
Korea.”293 
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peasant, student, professor, worker, etc. – become a proletarian. By the fall of 1958, some 600,000 backyard 
furnaces had sprung up all over the country… The steel turned out by the backyard blast furnaces could not meet 
industrial requirements, and many of these makeshift furnaces dissolved in rainstorms… In August 1959, 3 million 
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did not perform the same function as the giant steel mill… The general agricultural production index, using 1957 at 
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Lee, “The Emperor’s Famine,” Asia Policy (Book Review Roundtable), no.5 (January 2008): 189, 
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In retrospect, and with respect to the Kim regime’s perseverance well into the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, it appears safe to say that both Belke’s 1999 speculation and Kim 
Jong-il’s strategy seem to have been vindicated. Apart from Juche’s staying power, the evidence 
conveys a second, equally important point: Juche religious ideology seems almost infinitely 
adaptable and transformable. Juche’s living god, Kim Jong-il, infallible patriarch over the holy 
writ and master over the creed, not only explains and interprets the existing scripture. Kim Jong-
il’s commitment to “succeeding excellently to the cause of the late President Kim Il Sung”294 
implies that his present and future decisions and teachings are — and will be — unerringly in 
harmony with those of Kim Il-sung, the late founder of the North Korean paradise. 
Correspondingly, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Korea specialist, Edward A. 
Olsen, has ascertained that Juche: 
has evolved in a relatively innovative manner for a rigid state like the DPRK so 
that North Korea can adapt to changing circumstances in ways that permit it to 
avoid admitting any pursuit of reforms which would compel North Korean leaders 
to admit past mistakes.295 
Accordingly, the conclusion seems warranted that Juche and its fundamentalist spell — 
regardless of North Korea’s present and future economic situation, material scarcity, privation 
and famine — are likely to persevere as “the collective consciousness of the ‘Kim-country’ 
masses,” and as the ironclad legitimizing foundation for the regime of Kim Jong-il and his 
eventual dynastic successor.296 
B. JUCHE — AN APPEALING CONSTRUCT FOR BOTH KOREAN SOCIETIES? 
— LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
According to the 1995 Amnesty International Annual Report on the Republic of Korea, 
“Throughout the second half of the year dozens of students, dissidents, writers, publishers,  
academics and members of socialist organizations were arrested under the National Security 
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Law297 for allegedly ‘praising’ and ‘benefiting’ North Korea…Some were accused of being 
Jusapa298 (supporters of North Korea's Juche ideology).”299 
As early as August 1994, The New York Times had quoted Rev. Park Hong, “a Jesuit 
priest and the president of Sogang University,” as stating that “student protesters were being fed 
instructions from North Korea,” and that “‘jusapa,’ or followers of Kim Il Sung's ideology of 
self-reliance, had also infiltrated religious organizations, newspapers and political parties.”300 
Similarly, Bronwen Dalton and James Cotton, in their 1996 work on “political opposition 
in South Korea,” found that: 
Claims by the Sogang University president that ’15,000 jusapa’... have infiltrated 
political circles, mass communication media and universities also led to the 
detention of over 2000 people. This included nine Kyongsang University 
professors who were held on suspicion of ‘benefiting the enemy’ (as defined by 
the National Security Law).301 
At the time, Lee Ki Taek, then chairman of the oppositional Democratic Party, was quoted as 
having labeled the “crackdowns” on the activists a “McCarthyite witch hunt.”302 
In a 2001 article, Kyung-Ae Park explained the emergence of Jusapa as a consequence of 
South Korea’s “democratization movement” in the late 1980s. She argued that “North Korea’s 
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tenacious and fervent emphasis on Juche in reunification met with sympathy among South 
Korean youth, students, and dissidents.” Park concluded that “South Korean students and 
intellectuals” who “believed in Juche and aimed at eliminating foreign powers from South 
Korea” set out to “voice their aspirations for reunification, which even included a demand to 
pursue reunification on North Korean terms.”303 
Such an intellectual world within the Jusapa faction, apparently naively combining 
progressive and nationalistic motives for democratization and reunification, was also observed 
by Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington in 2007. Their study of “Democratization and 
Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea” explained that: 
Opposition activists, particularly college students and intellectuals, became 
radicalized and adopted strong anti-U.S. views… The group Jusapa… emerged 
and became widely supported by student activists in the mid-1980s. Along with 
other radical groups, Jusapa gained influence by getting its members elected to 
leadership positions in student governments at major universities. Aside from the 
small core of serious radicals, most Jusapa members did not seem aware of the 
full implications of some of the activists’ pro-North Korean aims. Rather, many 
followers were intelligent and idealistic students, the sons and daughters of the 
prospering middle class. Most supported Jusapa not because they were pro-North 
Korea but because they believed that the organization was at the forefront of the 
pro-democracy movement.304 
Likewise, Mi Park discerned such a progressive-nationalist rationale in her 2007 analysis 
of the South Korean trade union movement. She concluded that “Jusapa is thoroughly Korean 
nationalist imbued with cultish ideas of Kim Il-Sung.” She further found that “the Korean Left 
can be divided into two opposing political camps: Jusapa (NL) [National Liberation Party] and 
non-Jusapa (ND and PD) [National Democracy Party and People’s Democracy Party].” Park 
pointed out that “NL included Jusapa as well as all radical nationalists who did not necessarily 
subscribe to Kim Il-Sung’s Juche ideology.”305 
                                                 
303 Kyung-Ae Park, “Sources Of North Korea’s Foreign Policy Leverage Toward The U.S.: The Case Of The 
Nuclear Deal,” in Korea in the 21st Century, ed. Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Huntington, NY: Nova 
Science Publishers, 2001), 145. 
304 Chang Hun Oh and Celeste Arrington, “Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South 
Korea,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (March 1, 2007): 337, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed April 20, 2008). 
305 Mi Park, “South Korean Trade Union Movement at the Crossroads: A Critique of ‘Social-Movement’ 
Unionism,” Critical Sociology 33, (January 2007): 335, http://crs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/33/1-2/311 (accessed 
May 10, 2008). “The South Korean left of the 1980s consisted of three main political camps: those of NL (National 
Liberation), ND (National Democracy), and PD (People’s Democracy). The ND and PD camp followed Leninism, 
while the NL (National Liberation) camp adhered to Jucheism.” 
78 
 
However, in 2006 Jiyon Shin observed that, in the wake of South Korea’s progressing 
democratization, liberalization and sustained economic performance, some “former North Korea 
sympathizers — Jusapas…are [South] Korea’s leading new right intellectuals.” She explained 
that “Many of the new right movement’s leaders have leftist backgrounds,” and “converted from 
communist inclinations (Jusapa) to conservatism.”306 These members of the so called “386 
generation provided the main support base”307 for President Roh Moo-hyun’s 2002 election, 
which was described as a “culmination of the textbook case of democratic consolidation.”308 
Similarly, a 2006 Strategic Studies Institute publication conceded that: 
The “386” generation… have been a political force since the Chun Doo Hwan 
administration, but with the election of President Roh Moo Hyun in December 
2002, they have entered the corridors of power… Some have espoused looking at 
things from a North Korean point of view. Some from the jusapa, the National 
Liberation faction, are flat-out pro-North Korea. The “spirit of 6.15” and the 
rhetoric of han minjok (a single unitary race) are distilled in a powerful call for 
the cultural and racial unity of “fellow brothers” in a unified Korea. They have 
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Korean conservatives of the 1980s who boasted that North Korean nuclear 
weapons should not be worrisome because ‘it will be ours one day’ (after 
unification).309 
Mi Park, in her 2005 analysis of South Korean underground student movements in the 
1980s, endorsed such a theory of political activists’ conversion in post-Cold War South 
Korea.310 She made the point that the “ideologies of the South Korean left began to change, as an 
increasing number of activists saw new social developments contradicting their ideas.”311 
Unsurprisingly, the conversion of jusapa activists to conservatism appears to coincide 
with the undoubtedly disillusioning 1997 defection of Pyongyang’s leading Juche ideologist 
Hwang Jang-yop,312 the unveiling of the ravages of the North Korean famine, and the general 
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manifestation of the Pyongyang regime’s failure.313 One of the 386 generation’s alleged main 
leaders of South Korea’s new right movement, for example, was at the center of a 1999 
espionage scandal.314 According to a 1999 Asia Times article, “Kim Young-hwan, one of the 
most prominent leaders of pro-Pyongyang 1980s student radicals who called themselves jusapa 
(juche ideology faction), is reported to have confessed that he was a spy for Pyongyang.” The 
report maintains that Kim Young-hwan, on personal orders from Kim Il-sung, had instigated a 
“pro-Pyongyang underground” and had launched a “legal political party in the South…bringing 
in other veterans of the [South Korean] student anti-government movement.” After becoming 
“disillusioned with the North Korean system he was promoting,” Kim Young-hwan came to 
condemn Juche in 1995 and, “in fear for his life, fled to China.” The article explains that “Only 
recently did he return home and spill the beans,” as the South Korean “prosecution has 
recommended leniency for him and a colleague.”315 
Rim Kyu-jin, editorial writer for the internet news portal donga.com, commented in a 
similarly sardonic fashion in a 2005 opinion piece on South Korea’s “New Right’s Teaching 
Materials:” 
These days, leftist student activists are said to be reading sophisticated books such 
as “Capital beyond Capital” (Lee Jin-kyung). It is relieving to know that few 
students memorize like parrots the Pyongyang broadcast such as Jusapa, who 
advocated the Juche ideology of Kim Il Sung, did so in the past.316 
Correspondingly, Mi Park had offered a comparable assessment one month earlier: 
Most activists in the 1990s abandoned the idea that the Soviet Union and North 
Korea represented alternative societies. They reformulated movement strategies 
and tactics in accordance with a new perception of social reality. An increasing 
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number of activists believed that a project of developing a democratic ‘civil 
society’ should replace the call for revolution.317 
However, a significant measure of progressive pro-Pyongyang activism, combined with 
anti-U.S. sentiment, seems latent among South Korean intellectuals and members of the educated 
middle-class. The Chosun Ilbo, for example, reported in 2006 on the investigation of a “middle 
school teacher and member of the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union [KTEWU].” 
The teacher was “under investigation for taking his 180 students to an event commemorating the 
deaths of communist partisan guerrillas.” Reportedly, the tribute had been “organized by an 
‘unconverted’ long-term prisoner, a term referring to convicts who served on average 31 years in 
jail for violating the [South Korean] National Security Law and refusing to disavow their 
communist beliefs.” The Chosun Ilbo maintains that the KTEWU has “frequently revealed a 
political bias,” in particular during tutorials which “borrowed heavily from a North Korean 
history textbook hailing and praising North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's Songun or military-first 
policy.”318 
In her 2005 article “Organizing Dissent against Authoritarianism,” Mi Park offered 
remarkable insights about the scope, the societal penetration, and the domestic effects of the 
“South Korean Student Movement in the 1980s.” She argued that: 
The significance of the ‘386 generation’ is that the historical experience of the 
turbulent 1970s (the Yusin system) and 1980 (the Gwangju massacre) shaped the 
common generational consciousness of youths and this consciousness, in turn, 
became the basis of the political mobilization of students in the 1980s.319 
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Mi Park reasoned that the 1980 Gwangju massacre in particular was a turning point “for the 
Korean student movement” towards “the clearly stated goal” of “revolution.”320 In her view, the 
Gwangju massacre “discredited moderate political voices in the democratization movement and 
prepared the stage for a more radical movement.”321 Simultaneously, it acted as a “historical 
catalyst” for “intellectuals and university students” to become “the vanguard of the uisikhwa 
(consciousness raising) movement,”322 and promoted a “Marxist intellectual movement that 
flourished in the 1980s.”323 
Mi Park’s detailed analysis of the methods and organization of the students, and their 
movement’s strategy to achieve a broad popular mobilization and politization holds a particular 
significance. According to her research, the 1980s student movement did not remain confined to 
college and university campuses or to a limited number of leftist intellectuals. Instead, Mi Park 
draws a comprehensive picture of the student left capitalizing on widespread domestic societal 
grievances in the face of a diminishing Cold War communist threat, and successfully “organizing 
the masses” against the authoritarian South Korean regime.324 According to Mi Park: 
These underground student organizations played an instrumental role in 
facilitating grass-roots organizations ranging from independent student councils to 
independent trade unions. The concerted organizing efforts made by the student 
movement culminated in the two historic mass mobilizations of 1987 in which 
over a million people participated in illegal street demonstrations against the 
Chun administration.325 
Mi Park asserted that the South Korean “student generation of the 1980s played a pivotal role in 
the democratization of South Korean society.”326 
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In conclusion, the evidence presented above — based on certain aspects of the 1980s 
radical student movement and its strong influence on South Korea’s democratization process — 
is certainly not sufficient to support conclusive judgments as to whether Juche could appeal to 
South Korea’s society. However, the 386 generation’s evolution from a radical, left-wing student 
movement, via a grass-roots mass mobilization, to a current of opinion penetrating South 
Korea’s political establishment — even parts of the political new right — indicates a significant 
qualitative socio-cultural and political evolution. 
It can be argued that the 1980s radical student movement and the democratization process 
have potentially exposed South Korean society and its political elites to a variety of political 
influences, including North Korea’s Juche ideas. Consequently, the case can be made that the 
South Korean democratic policy space, while not likely to spontaneously and comprehensively 
embrace North Korea’s Juche idea, is almost certainly sufficiently mature and open to publicly 
debate and eventually connect with specific elements of Juche. In particular, Juche’s essential 
elements of nationalism and self-determination — if disassociated from Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and the veneration of the Kim dynasty — could offer grounds for socio-cultural and 
political appeal and identification north and south of the 38th parallel. 
Thus, South Korea’s developmental path and its recent democratization movement may 
have laid the basis to utilize certain appealing cultural and nationalistic elements of Juche as a 
pathway for eventual socio-cultural Korean re-unification. Accordingly, Colonel Jiyul Kim, 
Director of Asian Studies at the U.S. Army War College, made the point that “pan-Korean 
nationalism and anti-Great Power-ism” were the “two major ideological trends” that were 
“gaining momentum in South Korea.” In his 2005 study entitled “Pan-Korea Nationalism, Anti-
Great Power-ism and U.S.-South Korean Relations,” he predicted a consequent “significant shift 
in the locus of political interest and power” in South Korea. In Kim’s analysis, “pan-Korean 
nationalism” illustrated “the sense of Korean nationalism in South Korea that embraces north 
and south,” while the term “anti-Great Power-ism” described “the desire of Koreans to escape 
from the sort of Great Power exploitation and victimization, actual and perceived, that the 
Korean peninsula has experienced since the latter half of the 19th century.”327 
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At the same time, Edward A. Olsen observed that “what exists today in South Korea and 
North Korea amounts to ‘semi-nationalism.’” He reasoned that “each half of today’s Korea” 
perceived and utilized “their ethnic nation’s heritage…very differently [according] to how their 
portion of Korean society functions.”328 In his view, “what constitutes North Korea’s form of 
semi-nationalism domestically” is a “very nationalistic form of socialism,” relating to “Korea’s 
pre-modern authoritarianism in the name of both ‘Koreanism’ and communism.”329 
In contrast, South Koreans — due to their economic accomplishments and the country’s 
successful democratic transition — “became increasingly confident that the ROK was 
revitalizing Korea’s heritage.”330 Edward A. Olsen explained that: 
This amounted to different facets of South Korea’s semi-nationalism such as 
industrial pride based on the ROK’s economic achievements yielding what 
amounted to techno-nationalism, well received international cultural exchanges 
yielding what could be considered pop-culture semi-nationalism, and — due to 
how South Korean politicians restored full fledged democracy — an enormous 
level of genuine political semi-nationalism based on how South Koreans could 
effectively draw on Korean cultural traditions to create a form of political 
nationalism that the world at large could respect and that the North Koreans 
should envy.331 
However, similar to the earlier discussed analyses of the South Korean democratization 
movement, Jiyul Kim observed “a generational shift…that arose as a result of the end of the 
Cold War and democratization.” In his view, since both developments “occurred almost 
simultaneously for South Korea in the late 1980s,” both tendencies are “particularly powerful 
today.” 332 Kim reasoned that: 
Pan-Korean nationalism and anti-Great Power-ism are closely associated with 
changing notions of identity and nationalism…ideological forces that are driven 
by cultural factors such as the symbolism of historical experience or, more 
precisely, memory of that history.333 
Therefore, he discerned an “important generational divide,” and a “deep division and 
disunity…between the young, many of whom would embrace and help the North, and the old, 
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who hew to the anti-Communist anti-North Korea line that took root during the Korean War.”334 
Kim concluded that “the ideologies of pan-Korean nationalism and anti-Great Power-ism,” are 
among the “emerging political forces…that are creating the most important political fault lines” 
in South Korean politics today.335 Accordingly, in his analysis:  
The post-Korean War generation has matured and is poised to assume political 
leadership… Above all they reject the previous political paradigm that had 
functioned under the aegis of the Cold War and was based on intimate ties to the 
United States. They seek to realize the long held dream of achieving self-
determination, a Korea that is master of its own fate and destiny, a destiny that 
promises greatness. In their eyes, such a destiny can only be predicated on 
peaceful reunification.336 
Such an assessment seems to support the hypothesis that Juche elements of self-reliance, 
self-confidence, independence, and an inward-centered nationalism could indeed offer a 
significant appeal to today’s South Korean society and its political decision-makers. Olsen 
observed that: 
Korean nationalists in both of the current Korean states take enormous pride in 
how their ancestors created an ethnic Korean nation state and how they generally 
coped with pressures from neighboring – but not always neighborly – China and, 
later on, Japan.337 
Ultimately, utilizing such Juche elements to exploit Korean trends of “pan-Korean 
nationalism” and “anti-Great Power-ism” could hold the prospects to “very well resolve some of 
the thorniest security issues in the region.”338 
Similarly, Olsen has argued that “it is very likely that Korean reunification shall be 
influenced by nationalistic sentiments,” and has recommended that “external powers…become 
far more attentive to why Korean nationalism matters to reshaping Korea.” He has asserted that 
“what amounts to a form of pan-Korean nationalism seems to be more salient for the inter-
Korean dynamic [today] than it was in the past.”339 Olsen has reasoned that today, North Korea 
claims to be more “Korean” than South Korea — owing to South Korea’s exposure to 
                                                 
334 Kim, “Pan-Korea Nationalism.” 
335 Ibid., 8. 
336 Kim, “Pan-Korea Nationalism,” 1-2. 
337 Olsen, “Korean Nationalism,” 6. 
338 Ibid., 8. 
339 Ibid., 18. 
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“globalism and the cultural and linguistic impacts of other countries, migration into South Korea, 
and fairly significant levels of inter-marriage with people from all over the world.” He 
maintained that such a stance “resonates with some ethnic ultra-nationalists in the ROK in ways 
that South Korean officials cannot ignore.”340 Olsen has assessed that: 
One aspect of this set of policy issues that has not received enough attention from 
the US policy perspective is how Korean nationalism functions in a reuniting 
divided nation. This lack may have a significant impact on US policy as the 
reunification process evolves.341 
C. CONCLUSION: JUCHE — IDEOLOGICAL BARRIER OR PROSPECTIVE 
PATHWAY FOR KOREAN RE-UNIFICATION? 
In Chapter I it was hypothesized that Juche, as the conceptual frame of reference for 
North Korean society, may hold particular significance for a successful prospective Korean 
national re-unification. At the same time it was suggested that Juche’s potential role as an 
ideological barrier to — or pathway for — eventual Korean re-unification deserves further 
attention from scholars and political decision-makers. An appreciation for the frequently ignored 
but nonetheless important socio-cultural re-unification issues should be regarded as 
complementary to addressing potential economic and political re-unification matters. Regarding 
Juche as simply another tenuous version of Marxist-Leninist ideology, prone to rapidly implode 
at the outset of a re-unified Korea’s political and economic transformation, might underestimate 
the socio-cultural realities. 
Consequently, Chapter II explored Juche’s utopian, ideological and religious elements to 
establish its holistic power, its authority, and its penetration of North Korean individual and 
societal life. It was concluded that Juche indeed holds the fundamentalist characteristics of an 
ideological state religion. It was further determined that Juche — in contrast with superficially 
adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology in East Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe — has 
exerted significant structural and emotional effects on the North Korean masses and elites. 
Accordingly, it was concluded that Juche fundamentalism, as a mélange of Confucian-inspired 
vision and utopian ideas, pseudo-scientific ideological ingredients from Marxism-Leninism, and 
religiously inspired cultic elements, constitutes a significant bulwark for the Pyongyang regime’s  
 
                                                 
340 Olsen, “Korean Nationalism,” 6. 
341 Ibid., 5. 
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future survival. Combined with the Kim dynasty’s theocratic rule — ingrained into North Korean 
society for more than half a century — Juche fundamentalism would hold substantial relevance 
upon eventual Korean national re-unification. 
Subsequently, Chapter III established, based on examining German re-unification as an 
applicable comparative case, the significance for eventual socio-cultural re-unification of 
decades-long political, ideological, and cultural conditioning within discrete societies. It was 
concluded that the German “Unification Crisis” and “The Wall Inside The Minds” have 
persisted. Close to two decades, and an estimated €1.5 trillion beyond German re-unification, 
enduring socio-cultural tensions between East and West Germans, deriving from individual and 
societal receptiveness to, and the potency and the resilience of, ideology, emotional bonding, and 
societal conditioning, continue to be intrinsic and basic factors affecting national cohesion. 
Chapter IV revealed significant parallels in East German and North Korean social 
structures. Though to a lesser degree than in North Korea, the G.D.R.’s society was similarly 
anti-liberal and anti-libertarian. Its hierarchical societal organization, akin to that in North Korea, 
was based on class background and political reliability (Linientreue) towards the SED party. 
Hence, it was concluded that socio-cultural issues identified in the wake of the German re-
unification would probably hold similar relevance upon eventual Korean re-unification. 
The final chapter’s first two sections ascertained that Juche has great inherent adaptability 
and fundamentalist potency. For this reason, regardless of North Korea’s present and future 
economic situation, material scarcity, privation and famine, Juche is likely to persevere as “the 
collective consciousness of the ‘Kim-country’ masses focused on Juche purity.”342 It will 
therefore probably persist as the ironclad legitimizing foundation for the regime of Kim Jong-il 
and his eventual dynastic successor. At the same time, it was assessed that South Korea’s 
particular path of democratization could hold significant prospects for specific Juche elements to 
appeal to South Korean society. Juche’s essential elements of nationalism, self-determination, 
and self-reliance — if disassociated from Marxist-Leninist ideology — could offer future 
potential for political attraction and socio-cultural identity-building for both Korean societies. 
                                                 
342 Belke, Juche: A Christian Study, 349. 
88 
 
Overall, this study’s findings support the following five assessments. First, the hypothesis 
that North Korea’s Juche idea has indeed become a fundamental and deeply penetrating 
framework of orientation for North Koreans can be validated. In essence and in consequence, 
Juche’s synthesis of utopian ideas, deeply penetrating ideology, and devout state religion 
compares with other current fundamentalist belief systems and regimes. 
Second, despite noteworthy differences between the German and the Korean cases, the 
two share significant commonalities with regard to their societal, political, and economic realities 
that underline the relevance and applicability of the comparative cases. A comparable multi-
decade divergence in political, ideological, and cultural conditioning, it can be reasoned, has 
developed a significant qualitative disparity in the two Korean societies. Such pre-unification 
differences, the German case suggests, are likely to display prolonged perseverance well into the 
post-unification era, and may develop into significant antagonistic cross-currents during a re-
unified Korea’s political and economic transformation. At the same time, the German case offers 
evidence as to the substantial amount of treasure that would potentially be required, not only to 
promote political and economic transformation, but to mitigate the adverse socio-cultural effects 
of re-unifying the Korean societies. 
Third, North Korea’s Juche could raise challenges for national social cohesion upon 
Korea’s re-unification that would be more serious than those faced by the re-unified German 
state and society. The Kim dynasty’s theocratic rule and Juche’s fundamentalist characteristics 
— apparent in an analysis of comparable fundamentalist Muslim belief systems — are 
particularly distinctive and at variance with the G.D.R.’s relatively mild “Real Existing 
Socialism.” Consequently, Korean socio-cultural re-unification can be expected to suffer 
tremendously from phenomena similar to, but significantly more pronounced than, the German 
“Unification Crisis” and “The Wall Inside The Minds.” 
Fourth, North Korean realities are different from those which prevailed under former East 
European Communist regimes, including that in East Germany. In comparison with North Korea, 
the East German Communist governments relied on a limpid ideology and a half-hearted 
isolation and oppression of their populations. North Korea’s theocratic regime and its Juche 
fundamentalism are as unlikely to collapse in the face of famine and economic decline today as 
they have been for more than a decade. The example of other fundamentalist belief systems 
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warrants the inference that hunger, poverty, and material deprivation are unlikely to be effective 
incentives for the deeply indoctrinated North Korean people to defy their theocratic rulers. As 
long as Pyongyang’s pervasive political ideology of Juche remains interlocked with the 
religiously penetrating Kim cult, enforced and adapted by the living god Kim Jong-il, North 
Korean society’s disposition to suffer through further famine and decline might turn out to be 
virtually infinite. Despite continued decay, the ultimate collapse and implosion of the hermit 
kingdom might thus be in the distant future. It can further be argued that continued sanctions, 
isolation, and aggressive containment attempts vis-à-vis North Korea will have little prospect of 
bringing about regime change in Pyongyang. Rather, in view of Juche’s fundamentalist character 
and its pervasive societal penetration, the opposite outcome could be predicted. In a behavior 
pattern typical for fundamentalist belief systems and their communities, North Korean society 
might be propelled and motivated to a willingness to suffer above and beyond contemporary 
Muslim fundamentalist examples. Accordingly, rather than emphasizing Pyongyang’s putative 
irrationality, Juche’s fundamentalist character and its staying power need to be acknowledged by 
political decision-makers engaged with Korean issues. Successful future engagement strategies 
towards North Korea should be defined on the basis of a solid understanding of North Korea’s 
Juche idea as a conceptually holistic and fundamentalist frame of reference for the Kim regime’s 
political choices and decisions. 
Finally, it can be deduced that at present, North Korea’s Juche fundamentalism 
constitutes an ideological barrier to successful socio-cultural Korean re-unification. At the same 
time, however, it can be speculated that Juche’s potential for targeted redefinition, on the one 
hand, and the prospective appeal of its cultural and nationalistic elements, on the other hand, 
could in some circumstances serve as promising assets for a positive future development of the 
Korean issue. In contrast to other religions, whose ancient scriptures are subject to more or less 
orthodox interpretation only, Juche offers a wide range of development options. Its living god, 
Kim Jong-il, is the master of the cult; and he may be capable of modifying, adapting, and 
adjusting his state religion’s goals and ambitions to satisfy his regime’s requirements. Kim Jong-
il’s utilization of Juche for a successful power transition, and Juche’s simultaneous manipulation 
towards the “Military-First policy” and the “Red Flag ideology” to secure his regime, are 
significant indicators of such potential.  
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It goes without saying that Juche’s cultic deification of the Kim dynasty holds no 
potential appeal for the South Korean society. Consequently, engineering a Juche evolution 
towards its more appealing cultural and nationalistic facets, and away from its Kim cult 
veneration, could hold the key for Juche’s eventual re-unification utility. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether the recent modification of the official D.P.R.K. webpage and its apparent 
abandonment of traditional Kim cult veneration (as discussed in Chapter II), at least on the 
World Wide Web, could serve as an indicator for such a development in progress.343 
Hence, future scholarly interest and concentrated research are warranted, not only on both 
sides of the 38th parallel, to establish a roadmap as to whether and how it might be possible to 
utilize Juche and its potential appeal to South Koreans to benefit eventual Korean re-unification. 
Though re-unification appears to be essentially an inter-Korean issue, the role of external powers 
in providing a favorable environment for solving the Korean issue should not be underestimated. 
The German re-unification experience suggests that international consent, stewardship, honest 
mediation and brokerage may be essential and instrumental to ultimately terminate Korea’s 
decade-long division. 
Accordingly, assessing Juche’s utility for eventual successful Korean re-unification might 
not be a task limited exclusively to the two Korean states. Instead, in addition, and 
complementary to political and economic support for Korean re-unification, Juche’s soft-power 
significance and its potential for engineered evolution should be recognized. External powers 
should provide and support incentives — for both Korean states — to develop and utilize 
constructive elements of Juche as a pathway to successful Korean socio-cultural re-unification, 
to the ultimate benefit of future stability on the Korean peninsula and in Asia. 
                                                 
343 In March 2008, the “DPR Korea, Official Webpage” (http://www.korea-dpr.com/pmenu.htm) described the 
“Leaders” of the D.P.R.K. as “the sun of the nation and mankind.” In May 2008 this URL was no longer active. A 
modified “DPR Korea, Official Webpage” (http://www.korea-dpr.com/) no longer utilizes such ornate language to 
portray the D.P.R.K. leaders. However, “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung’s Autobiography – an epic work of 24 Chapters 
and 2161 pages – is still available as a 7.22MB PDF version (see http://www.korea-dpr.com/library/202.pdf). In 
comparison, the 1982 “new King James version” of the Holy Bible, “containing the Old and New Testaments” 
comprises 1236 pages (Holy Bible: The New King James Version, Containing the Old and New Testaments 
(Nashville: T. Nelson, 1982)). In contrast, “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il’s “Brief History” contains a mere 160 pages 
(see http://www.korea-dpr.com/library/103.pdf for the PDF document). See Chapter II, note 115. 
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It is conceivable, for example, that the Kaesong Industrial Complex (K.I.C.) could offer 
such potential for U.S.-promoted incentives.344 The K.I.C., it could be argued, strengthens inter-
Korean cooperation and reconciliation, and resonates with pan-Korean notions of self-reliance, 
self-determination, and national accomplishment. At the same time, Washington’s consent to a 
modified “Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)” to include goods manufactured at 
the K.I.C. could significantly boost the K.I.C.’s economic relevance and consequently enhance 
its utility for inter-Korean reconciliation.345 To complement this economic step, the U.S. could 
utilize its international weight to press for a Korean War peace treaty, thereby creating a 
favorable environment for normalized relations between the two states on the Korean peninsula. 
It can be reasonably argued that the prevalent framework of the 1953 “Armistice Agreement for 
the Restoration of the South Korean State” is ill-suited to promote twenty-first century 
reconciliation and a normalization of relations among the belligerents.346 At the same time, U.S. 
agreement to North Korea’s long desired U.S.-D.P.R.K. non-aggression pact could have a 
significantly catalytic effect on such a process. 
Similarly creative and beneficial ventures could be imagined in cooperation with Korea’s 
neighbors in the region. Japan and the P.R.C., for example, could utilize their historical ties and 
their cultural affiliation with the Korean people to acknowledge the potential of Juche’s 
                                                 
344 The Kaesong Industrial Complex (K.I.C.) is an inter-Korean economic joint venture to promote cooperation 
and North-South Korean reconciliation in the realm of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy.”For details see: Dick K. 
Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex,” Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress (CRS Order Code RL34093, July 19, 2007).  
345 According to the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), the duty-free entry of South Korean 
goods into the United States does not include goods from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (K.I.C.). The agreement’s 
Annex 22-B, however, offers the inclusion of Outward Processing Zones (O.P.Z.). Declaring the K.I.C. such an 
Outward Processing Zone would enormously boost the venture’s economic significance. For more detailed 
information on the K.I.C. see: Nanto and Manyin. “The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex.” 
346 The “Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State… signed on July 27, 1953 
formally ended the war in Korea. North and South Korea remain separate and occupy almost the same territory they 
had when the war began… It was the end of the longest negotiated armistice in history: 158 meetings spread over 
two years and 17 days… The Korean Armistice Agreement is somewhat exceptional in that it is purely a military 
document [;] no nation is a signatory to the agreement. Specifically the Armistice Agreement: 1. suspended open 
hostilities; 2. withdrew all military forces and equipment from a 4,000-meter-wide zone, establishing the 
Demilitarized Zone as a buffer between the forces; 3. prevented both sides from entering the air, ground, or sea areas 
under control of the other; 4. arranged release and repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and 5. 
established the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure 
adherence to the truce terms. The armistice, while it stopped hostilities, was not a permanent peace treaty between 
nations.” See: “Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State (1953),” Historical Documents 
in United States History, http://www.historicaldocuments.com/KoreanWarArmistice.htm (accessed May 23, 2008). 
For the transcript of the original document see: 
http://www.historicaldocuments.com/KoreanWarArmisticeTranscript.htm (accessed May 23, 2008). 
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constructive elements for Korean re-unification. After the eventual resolution of perpetually 
volatile issues like the “comfort women,”347 the “Japanese reparations,”348 or those of the 
“Japanese abductees”349 to name just a few, Japan could be in a suitable position to encourage 
Juche’s adaptation to a healthy unified Korean identity. 
At the same time, traditionally cultivated strong ties between North Korea and China 
seem to combine effectively with a continuously improving Seoul-Beijing relationship and could 
justify a prominent role for China as an honest and credible broker for the benefit of a unified 
Korea.350 In such a capacity, China could, for example, host and support a future “Pan-Korean 
Institute for Socio-Cultural Re-Unification Studies,” as a forum for research and scholarly 
discourse as well as cooperative interaction between scientists and political decision-makers. 
                                                 
347 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 178-179. Cumings observed that the Japanese “sexual slavery” of 
Korean “comfort women” between 1942 and 1945 “fractured the Korean national psyche, pitting Korean against 
Korean with consequences that continue down to our time,” because “many [Korean] women were mobilized by 
[collaborating] Korean men.”  
348 Mark E. Manyin, “North Korea-Japan Relations: The Normalization Talks and the 
Compensation/Reparations Issue,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (CRS Order Code 
RS20526, 2001): 2-3, http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/01june13_nkjapan.pdf (accessed May 23, 2008). According to a 
2001 CRS Report for Congress, “Some Japanese experts believe that North Korea will ask for a settlement in the 
$20 billion range… According to one report in the Japanese press, Japanese officials in October 2000 were 
considering a $9 billion package… Japan is refusing North Korea’s demand that the package be labeled as 
‘reparations,’ or even ‘compensation.’ Instead, Tokyo has offered to characterize the monies as ‘economic 
assistance,’ as it did in the 1965 Japan-South Korean normalization negotiations… Additionally, North Korea is 
demanding that Japan issue a formal, ‘legally binding apology’ from the Japanese emperor and/or prime minister. 
Japan has countered that a sufficient apology was extended as part of [the] 1995 statement by then-Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama expressing regret for Japan’s past actions.”  
349 “Police question S. Korean actress over Japanese abductees,” Asian Political News, March 16, 2008, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2008_March_16/ai_n25157309 (accessed May 23, 2008). During 
Japanese “Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's landmark visit to North Korea” in 2002, “Kim [Jong-il] admitted to 
the abductions of 13 Japanese in the late 1970s and early 1980s by North Korean agents. Pyongyang maintains… 
[that] eight [abductees] have died, a claim disputed by their families and the Japanese government which officially 
recognizes 17 abductees. Japan's National Police Agency currently has a total of four North Korean agents on the 
international wanted list for their alleged involvement in the kidnapping.”  
350 Aruna Lee and Peter Schurmann, “South Korean Embassies in China Turn Away Escapees from North,” 
New America Media, News Feature, January 25, 2007, 
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=af5132ae2b1e428f9e88643641a32c17 
(accessed May 23, 2008). A 2007 New America Media (NAM) article – referring to reports from the Korean-
language Chosun Daily and The Korea Times – described how “[South] Korean embassies in China are coming 
under harsh criticism for their recent mishandling of several cases involving South Korean citizens who fled North 
Korea and were reportedly turned away by their own embassies in China… One editorial in the Chosun Daily 
bitterly accused the South Korean government of turning its back on its own people… South Korean embassies in 
China face a difficult task in handling North Korean defectors, whom Beijing insists are economic migrants, not 
political refugees. Many remain in hiding, fearful of apprehension by Chinese authorities and deportation back to the 
North, where most face imprisonment or death. Pressured by Beijing, South Korean embassies remain reluctant to 
open their doors to asylum seekers, despite South Korean law, which recognizes all North Koreans as citizens of the 
South.” Such a harsh South Korean policy towards North Korean refugees on Chinese soil might be an indicator for 
Seoul’s implicit efforts to prevent a tarnishing of fertile relations with Beijing. 
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In sum, a concerted engagement effort by key external powers — not only in the political 
and economic realm, but on a broad socio-cultural level — could indeed lay the ground for 
eventual successful Korean re-unification. Ultimately, the constructive elements in Juche could 
offer an entry strategy towards such an effort in order to bring a conclusive solution to the long-
standing Korean conflict, so that it will no longer be a source of dispute and instability 
throughout the Asian region, with potentially global repercussions. 
Consequently, the potential utility of certain aspects of Juche for the socio-cultural 
dimensions of Korean unification should be acknowledged, planned for and exploited while time 
permits. Despite the prospective staying power of Juche and the predicted perseverance of the 
Kim dynasty, the German experience has shown how unexpectedly and rapidly a failed state’s 
collapse can come about. Failure to undertake timely preparations or continued exclusive focus 
on the political and economic issues associated with Korean re-unification — to the neglect of 
socio-cultural and ideological factors — would probably be dearly paid for in the post-
unification era and would significantly impede Korea’s successful socio-cultural re-unification in 
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